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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Under President Barack Obama, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
has issued a number of Clean Air Act regulations that seek to reduce domestic greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions.  These regulations—which cover GHG emissions from motor 
vehicles, transportation fuels, new and existing power plants, the oil and gas sector, and 
municipal landfills—form an essential part of the nation’s overall response to climate 
change.  However, the United States will need to find other ways to reduce GHG 
emissions if it is to live up to its international emissions reduction pledge and maintain its 
position as a leader in the effort to prevent dangerous levels of global warming.  While 
EPA can continue with its present approach, tackling individual sources separately is not 
optimal.  The scale and scope of the climate change problem, and the need for immediate 
and significant action, call for a well-coordinated, comprehensive national program to 
reduce GHG emissions.     
The success of the recent climate negotiations in Paris provides a strong basis for 
invoking a powerful tool available to help achieve the country’s climate change goals:  
Section 115 of the Clean Air Act, titled “International Air Pollution.”  This provision 
authorizes EPA to require states to address emissions that contribute to air pollution 
endangering public health or welfare in other countries, if the other countries provide the 
U.S. with reciprocal protections.  The language of Section 115 does not limit the agency to 
regulating a particular source-type, or a given industrial or economic sector.  Rather, it 
grants EPA and the states broad latitude to address international air pollution 
comprehensively through the Clean Air Act’s State Implementation Plan process, 
increasing administrative efficiency and reducing burdens on regulated companies.  EPA 
and the states could use the provision to establish an economy-wide, market-based 
approach for reducing GHG emissions.  Such a program could provide one of the most 
effective and efficient means to address climate change pollution in the United States. 
Legal Pathways to Reducing GHG Emissions under Section 115 of the Clean Air Act 
 
Sabin Center| Emmett Institute | Policy Integrity ii 
 
This Report—which reflects the collaborative efforts of scholars and lawyers at the 
Sabin Center for Climate Change Law at Columbia Law School, the Emmett Institute on 
Climate Change and the Environment at UCLA School of Law, the Institute for Policy 
Integrity at NYU School of Law, and the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia 
SIPA—contains a careful legal analysis of the potential for reducing GHG emissions under 
Section 115.  The analysis demonstrates that Section 115 provides the authority and 
flexibility necessary to design a climate change program that maximizes efficacy and 
efficiency for state and federal regulators, regulated businesses, and, ultimately, the public 
at large.  The analysis and conclusions have been endorsed by a group of the nation’s 
leading experts on climate change and environmental law. 
The Report’s primary conclusions are as follows:        
 Regulation of GHG emissions under Section 115 is legal because both 
prerequisites for invoking the provision are satisfied: Section 115 is triggered 
when (1) EPA finds that emissions in the United States contribute to air pollution 
that endangers public health or welfare in another country (the “endangerment 
finding”), and (2) EPA determines that the other country provides “essentially the 
same rights with respect to the prevention or control of air pollution occurring in 
that country as is given that country” by Section 115 (the “reciprocity 
determination”).  In the context of climate change, both of these prerequisites are 
easily met.  First, there can be no real question that GHG emissions in the U.S. are a 
form of air pollution and contribute to climate change, which endangers health and 
welfare in countries all around the world.  Second, EPA has ample support to make 
a reciprocity determination.  Although there are numerous bilateral and 
multilateral agreements on which EPA might rely, the strongest evidence may be 
found in the procedural rights provided and the substantive commitments made 
through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
and the international efforts to address climate change which recently coalesced in 
Paris in December 2015.  Indeed, the Paris Agreement provides for both an 
“enhanced transparency framework,” through which the U.S. can comment on 
other countries’ climate action, and the submission of Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions (INDCs), which include significant pledges to mitigate 
GHG emissions.  At the time of this writing, nearly 190 countries have made 
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emissions reductions pledges through the INDC process, accounting for over 93% 
of current global GHG emissions.    
 
 Regulation of GHG emissions under Section 115 is good policy because it can use 
market mechanisms and obviate the need for multiple sector-by-sector 
regulations:  Section 115 is made effective through revisions to State 
Implementation Plans (SIPs), which are developed by states in accordance with 
Section 110 of the Clean Air Act.  The SIP process allows EPA and the states to 
address multiple sources of GHG in a single proceeding and expressly authorizes 
the use of “economic incentives such as fees, marketable permits, and auctions of 
emission rights.”  Section 115 thereby provides an opportunity for avoiding 
potentially dozens of source-specific GHG regulations under other provisions of the 
Act, while simultaneously allowing businesses to lower their compliance costs 
through reliance on market-based approaches.              
 
 Section 115 applies to GHG emissions: Any argument that Section 115 cannot be 
used to regulate GHG emissions because Section 110 does not address GHGs has 
been foreclosed by both a Supreme Court decision and EPA and state practice, 
which respectively call for and enact regulation of GHGs under Section 110.  In 
addition, the plain language of the provision, the context provided by the Clean Air 
Act, and the legislative history of the provision all indicate that regulating GHG 
emissions under Section 115 falls well within the discretion given to EPA under the 
statute.   
 
 EPA can use the national goal set forth by the U.S. in its INDC as an aggregate 
limit for GHG emissions: Because emissions from all U.S. states contribute to 
foreign endangerment, and reductions from any state would contribute equally to 
solving the problem, successful implementation of Section 115 would require EPA 
to establish an aggregate amount of necessary U.S. emissions reductions.  As a 
matter of both law and policy, it would be eminently reasonable for EPA to 
establish a national GHG emissions target under Section 115 based on the U.S.’s 
contribution to a global effort to reduce GHG emissions, such as the U.S. INDC 
submitted to the UNFCCC in March 2015.  Although domestic emissions reductions 
alone may not eliminate climate change, they can in conjunction with reciprocal 
efforts by other nations prevent many of its impacts.  
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 EPA can apportion emissions allowances to the states based on a number of 
different methodologies: Section 115 does not dictate a methodology for 
apportionment of the national emission reduction goal among the states, leaving 
EPA with the discretion to determine the best way to do so.  Accordingly, EPA 
might utilize a variety of formulas.  For example, EPA might require each state to 
meet an equal percentage reduction, as measured from a selected baseline year.  
Alternatively, it might require each state to reduce its emissions to a point where 
marginal cost reductions are equal across states, thereby achieving the same target 
but assigning responsibility based on implementation costs rather than equal 
percentage reductions.  To temper potential disparate impacts from these 
approaches, EPA might choose a third methodology that combines the two 
methods, assigning a portion of required reductions as a percentage of state 
emissions but another portion on the basis of cost.  
 
 If necessary, EPA can implement a federal Section 115 program within 
recalcitrant states: Under the Clean Air Act, states have the primary responsibility 
for addressing air pollution, primarily through their SIPs.  The SIP process is also 
assigned the task of implementing international air pollution control requirements 
set forth under Section 115.  As with conventional criteria pollutants, if a state does 
not submit a SIP for Section 115 pollutants, or submits a SIP that is inadequate, EPA 
must promulgate a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) for that state.  In order to 
encourage states to submit SIPs, to reduce the administrative burden on states, or to 
encourage uniformity sought by industry, EPA may issue guidance or model rules 
for how states can achieve compliance.  Where states still do not comply, EPA can 
design and implement a streamlined FIP, including one that includes a trading 
mechanism.  
 
 EPA can integrate a new Section 115 program with existing and future rules for 
stationary sources: Any action EPA undertakes pursuant to Section 115 will take 
place while EPA also implements other critical GHG emissions regulations, 
including the New Source Performance Standards established under Section 111 for 
new power plants, the Clean Power Plan established under Section 111 for existing 
power plants, and methane emissions reductions standards for the oil and gas 
sector and municipal landfills.  EPA and the states can readily integrate these 
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existing rules—and any future ones—into a more comprehensive GHG emissions 
regime established under Section 115 by allowing states to take credit for any 
emission reductions achieved under the rules.  If the power sector has low-cost 
emission reduction opportunities remaining after compliance with the Clean Power 
Plan, Section 115 could permit cross-sectoral trading that would economically 
benefit both the power sector and other regulated sources. 
  
 EPA can integrate regulation of transportation fuels (and residential and 
commercial natural gas) into a Section 115 program: Section 115 would enable 
states to develop implementation plans that address GHG emissions from 
transportation fuels, which account for about 27% of GHG emissions. The most 
attractive option might be to integrate transportation fuels into a cross-sectoral, 
interstate market-based trading program, thus achieving the cost-savings and 
efficiency of a universal cap.  Alternatively, states might opt for carbon taxes, 
enhanced transportation planning, or a low carbon fuel standard under a Section 
115 SIP.  Similar approaches are available to address emissions from residential and 
commercial use of natural gas.      
 
 EPA could permit the use of offsets in an economy-wide, cross-sectoral trading 
program: Under Section 115, EPA should have considerable discretion to allow or 
disallow offsets or to impose restrictions on their use, potentially creating 
additional cost-saving opportunities.   
Section 115 of the Clean Air Act provides an untapped but potent opportunity for 
achieving many of the United States’ long-term climate change goals.  The goals that 
Section 115 can advance include reducing GHG emissions significantly in an economically 
and administratively efficient manner that provides ample flexibility for states and 
regulated entities and opportunities for continuing innovation that can accommodate the 
need to ramp up climate change mitigation ambition in the near future.  EPA and the 
states could implement a Section 115 regime with less difficulty than the current, sector-
by-sector, source-by-source approach, and could instead combine multiple sectors and 
source types in a single rulemaking that could establish a nationwide, market-based 
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emissions reduction program.  Such an approach would be legally defensible, and while 
implementation issues would be inevitable, as they are in any regulatory program, they 
would also be manageable.  Ultimately, regulation of GHG emissions under Section 115 
would provide EPA with the opportunity to develop a comprehensive, market-based, 
nationwide platform that would increase the scope of emissions covered, streamline 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the absence of federal climate change legislation, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) has taken extensive action to reduce domestic greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions under the Clean Air Act.  The agency has promulgated regulations addressing 
GHG emissions from motor vehicles, transportation fuels, new and existing power plants, 
the oil and gas sector, and municipal landfills.  These measures, along with various 
reporting rules and an anticipated rule addressing GHG emissions from aircraft, form an 
essential part of the nation’s overall response to climate change.  More, however, is 
required.  In order to achieve President Barack Obama’s international pledge to cut 
emissions by up to 28 percent by 2030, and in order to live up to the United States’ 
commitment to seek to reduce GHG emissions to the point where global warming may yet 
be limited to 2 degrees Celsius, the nation will need to find other ways to mitigate climate 
change.  Without further action, we cannot get to where we need to be from where we are 
today.1  
Section 115 of the Clean Air Act, titled “International Air Pollution,” provides a 
powerful, and as yet unused, tool to help achieve the country’s climate change goals.  The 
provision authorizes EPA to require states to address emissions that contribute to air 
pollution endangering public health or welfare in other countries, if the other countries 
provide the U.S. with reciprocal protections.  The language of the provision does not limit 
the agency to regulating a particular source-type, or a given industrial or economic sector.  
Rather, it grants EPA and the states broad latitude to address international air pollution 
through the Clean Air Act’s state implementation plan (SIP) process.  Notably, EPA and 
the states could use the provision to establish an economy-wide, cross-sectoral GHG 
emissions trading program that incorporates both stationary and mobile sources.  In so 
                                                     
1
 See WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, DELIVERING ON THE U.S. CLIMATE COMMITMENT: A 10-POINT PLAN TOWARD A 
LOW CARBON FUTURE – WORKING PAPER EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2015). 
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doing it could provide one of the most effective and efficient means to address climate 
change pollution in the United States.2  
The time is ripe for EPA to consider use of its authority for international air 
pollution control.  Unique among the provisions of the Clean Air Act, Section 115 requires 
actions by other nations as a prerequisite for domestic emission reductions.  The growing 
international efforts to address climate change, which recently coalesced in Paris in 
December 2015, provide a firm predicate for invoking Section 115 in the United States.  
Whatever the legal merits of using Section 115 to regulate greenhouse gases might have 
been in prior years, both of the legal prerequisites for action – endangerment and 
reciprocity – are now present.  As a legal matter, EPA has ample authority to move 
forward with regulation under Section 115.     
As a policy matter, regulation under Section 115 is a powerful tool that would well 
serve the interests of regulators, regulated sources, and the public at large.  The flexibility 
of its provisions – allowing states clear authority to use market based regulatory 
mechanisms across all regulated sectors – is especially well-suited to greenhouse gas 
regulation.  The alternative to using Section 115 to address GHG emissions from stationary 
sources is a series of source-specific regulations under Section 111 of the Clean Air Act.3  
Potentially dozens of source categories would need to be regulated, including steel mills, 
cement plants, wastewater treatment facilities, and petrochemical plants and refineries.4  
EPA would need to establish source-specific regulations for both new and existing 
facilities in each of these categories, which would be time-consuming and expensive for 
EPA and burdensome for state air pollution agencies to implement.  For the regulated 
sources, standards under section 111 would provide at best limited flexibility to use 
                                                     
2
 See, e.g., Nathaniel O. Keohane, Cap and Trade, Rehabilitated: Using Tradable Permits to Control U.S. Greenhouse 
Gases, 8 REV. ENVTL. & ECON. POL’Y 42, 49 (2009) (“From an economic perspective, a cap . . . should cover as much 
of the economy as possible . . . . The broader the program, the greater are the gains from trade, and the lower are the 
total costs of meeting a given target.”). 
3
 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1) (2012); 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.30b—60.676 (2015) (establishing standards of performance for 
multiple source categories). 
4
 See U.S. EPA, INVENTORY OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS, 1990-2012 ES-5 to ES-7 tbl.ES-2 (2014) 
(listing multiple sources of GHG emissions).  
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market-based mechanisms to reduce compliance costs.  Significantly, under the current 
approach sources would not be able to purchase emission reductions from facilities in 
other source categories, like power plants, that might have much lower abatement costs. 
In comparison, Section 115 would allow EPA to avoid serial rulemakings and 
consolidate the process.  Because it operates through SIPs, Section 115 would give states 
wide-ranging flexibility in developing their implementation plans, including the authority 
to use market-based approaches like emissions trading programs or emissions fees to 
minimize compliance costs.  As a result, Section 115 would lead to lower compliance costs 
and greater operational latitude for the regulated sources.  In addition, a Section 115 
regime would allow EPA and the states to reach sources that are not subject to Section 111 
at all, such as transportation fuels and commercial and residential natural gas, and could 
create a role for carefully vetted offsets, both of which would generate options for further 
cost savings.  Indeed, Section 115 is capacious enough for EPA and the states to build an 
emissions trading program that is interstate, national or even international in scale, and 
that is economy-wide in scope, incorporating power plants and other Section 111 sources, 
non-Section 111 industrial sources, transportation fuels, commercial and residential 
natural gas, energy efficiency initiatives, planning efforts, and so on.5   
A Section 115 regime would also provide an important backstop for EPA, the states, 
and industry.  The Clean Power Plan, the rule developed by EPA to reduce GHGs from 
existing power plants, along with EPA’s other regulatory initiatives, have been the subject 
of relentless litigation, casting a shadow of doubt over their implementation.  Though the 
authors of this paper are of the view that the Clean Power Plan and EPA’s other 
regulations represent reasonable interpretations of ambiguous provisions of the Clean Air 
Act and therefore should withstand legal challenge, Section 115 provides a potential 
backstop should any or all of these measures fail in court.  Moreover, several politicians 
have voiced concern over the legality of the agreement resulting from the 21st Conference 
                                                     
5
 See WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, CAN THE U.S. GET THERE FROM HERE? SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS (2012). 
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of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) in Paris (COP21).  Action under Section 115 could buttress the legality of the 
agreement as a valid exercise of executive power.   
In the pages that follow we elaborate on these essential points.  Part I provides an 
introduction, discussing how Section 115 works, what Congress intended, and how courts 
have treated the provision to date.  In Part II, we analyze the legal basis for regulating 
GHG emissions under Section 115, focusing on how EPA could substantiate the required 
endangerment finding and reciprocity determination and addressing potential challenges 
to EPA initiating action.  Part III addresses legal issues that the agency may confront in 
implementation of a Section 115 GHG emissions regime.  Here we examine the 
appropriate bases for establishing a national GHG emissions reduction target and for 
allocating reductions among the states; the scope of authority EPA possesses to develop 
and implement federal implementation plans (FIPs) for states that decide not to take 
independent action; integration of a Section 115 regime with existing GHG regulations; the 
use of Section 115 to regulate transportation fuels and consumer use of natural gas; and 
the potential role of offsets in a Section 115 emissions trading program.  Part IV offers 
some concluding thoughts.       
2. A SECTION 115 PRIMER 
2.1 How Section 115 Works 
Section 115 of the Clean Air Act, entitled “International Air Pollution,” provides the 
executive branch with the authority to require states to address air pollution that threatens 
a foreign country, where that country also provides reciprocal protections for the United 
States.  The provision has been invoked by EPA only once, in the 1980s, in an early attempt 
to control acid rain pollution generated in the United States and Canada.  But the progress 
that has recently been made in encouraging international action to address climate change 
makes Section 115 relevant once again.  As will be seen, it provides a powerful means to 
Legal Pathways to Reducing GHG Emissions under Section 115 of the Clean Air Act 
 
Sabin Center| Emmett Institute | Policy Integrity 5 
 
employ administrative action to address transboundary air pollution, including climate 
change.   
The full text is as follows:  
Sec. 115.  International air pollution 
(a) Endangerment of public health or welfare in foreign 
countries from pollution emitted in United States 
Whenever the Administrator, upon receipt of reports, surveys or 
studies from any duly constituted international agency has reason to 
believe that any air pollutant or pollutants emitted in the United 
States cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be 
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare in a foreign country 
or whenever the Secretary of State requests him to do so with respect 
to such pollution which the Secretary of State alleges is of such a 
nature, the Administrator shall give formal notification thereof to the 
Governor of the State in which such emissions originate. 
(b) Prevention or elimination of endangerment 
The notice of the Administrator shall be deemed to be a finding under 
section 7410(a)(2)(H)(ii) of this title which requires a plan revision 
with respect to so much of the applicable implementation plan as is 
inadequate to prevent or eliminate the endangerment referred to in 
subsection (a) of this section.  Any foreign country so affected by such 
emission of pollutant or pollutants shall be invited to appear at any 
public hearing associated with any revision of the appropriate portion 
of the applicable implementation plan. 
(c) Reciprocity 
This section shall apply only to a foreign country which the 
Administrator determines has given the United States essentially the 
same rights with respect to the prevention or control of air pollution 
occurring in that country as is given that country by this section. 
(d) Recommendations 
Recommendations issued following any abatement conference 
conducted prior to August 7, 1977, shall remain in effect with respect 
to any pollutant for which no national ambient air quality standard 
has been established under section 7409 of this title unless the 
Administrator, after consultation with all agencies which were party 
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to the conference, rescinds any such recommendation on grounds of 
obsolescence.6 
 
Under the express terms of the provision, two conditions must be satisfied to 
trigger states’ obligations to reduce emissions.  First, the EPA Administrator must issue an 
endangerment finding.  An endangerment finding may be issued under Section 115 where 
the Administrator “has reason to believe,” based on “reports, surveys or studies from any 
duly constituted international agency,” that air pollutants emitted in the United States 
“cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger 
public health or welfare in a foreign country.”7  This language is nearly identical to that of 
Clean Air Act Section 202(a), under which EPA issued an endangerment finding for 
greenhouse gases in 2009,8 except that Section 115 specifically addresses international 
pollution.  Alternatively, the U.S. Secretary of State may initiate the endangerment finding 
by requesting the Administrator to act in response to pollution the Secretary “alleges is of 
such a nature.”9 
Second, to invoke authority under Section 115 the EPA Administrator must make a 
reciprocity finding.  Such a finding may be made where the Administrator determines that 
the endangered foreign country gives “essentially the same rights with respect to the 
prevention or control” of its own air pollution as is provided by Section 115.10  This 
language has no clear analog to any other provision of the Clean Air Act.  It is nearly 
identical to language in Section 310 of the Clean Water Act—a parallel authority for cross-
                                                     
6
 42 U.S.C. § 7415 (2012). 
7
 42 U.S.C. § 7415(a). 
8
 Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 
Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009).  Section 202(a) calls for the Administrator to issue standards for vehicle emissions 
“which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public 
health or welfare.”  42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2012). 
9
 42 U.S.C. § 7415(a). 
10
 Id. § 7415(c). 
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boundary pollution of water resources—but Section 310 not been used or interpreted by 
the courts.11   
When both conditions are met, the Administrator must notify the governor of each 
state where the pollution originates that its State Implementation Plan (SIP) is “inadequate 
to prevent or eliminate the endangerment.”12  The state must then revise its SIP, under the 
procedures in Section 110 of the Clean Air Act, to meet the requirements of Section 115.13  
In doing so, states will have considerable discretion in how to address the pollution.  
Among the tools available to the state under Section 110 are “economic incentives such as 
fees, marketable permits, and auctions of emissions rights.”14  If a state fails to submit a 
revised SIP, or if the state’s SIP is inadequate or incomplete, EPA must promulgate a 
Federal Implementation Plan for the state.15     
2.2 Legislative History of Section 115 
The international air pollution provision was first enacted in 1965 as Section 105 of 
the original Clean Air Act. 16   Like the current Section 115, Section 105 had two 
prerequisites for action:  (1) an endangerment finding and (2) a reciprocity determination.  
In fact, the reciprocity language in Section 105 was identical to the language now in 
Section 115, with the exception that the reciprocity determination was to be made by the 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, not the EPA Administrator (a position that 
had not yet been created).  Section 105 differed from the current Section 115 primarily in 
what was triggered once these prerequisites were met.  Under Section 105, a finding that 
U.S. air pollution was endangering another nation and a determination that the foreign 
                                                     
11
 See 33 U.S.C. § 1320(a) (2012) (conditioning application on foreign country providing “essentially the same rights 
with respect to the prevention and control of pollution occurring in that country as is given that country by this 
subsection.”). 
12
 42 U.S.C. § 7415(a), (b). 
13
 SIPs are traditionally thought of as state plans for attaining health-based air quality standards EPA establishes for 
criteria pollutants.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1).  This is indeed a primary function of SIPs.  Id.  But Section 
110(a)(2)(D)(2) provides that SIPs must also comply with any requirements EPA establishes under Section 115.  42 
U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(2). 
14
 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A). 
15
 Id. § 7410(c)(1).  
16
 Clean Air Act Amendments and Solid Waste Disposal Act, Pub. L. No. 89-272 (1965). 
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nation provided reciprocal rights to the United States triggered a multi-step abatement 
process.  First, the Secretary was empowered to convene a conference of relevant local, 
state, and interstate agencies, as well as the foreign nation involved, to discuss the air 
pollution and the adequacy of measures to reduce it.  If the Secretary determined that the 
conference did not achieve effective abatement, Section 105 then authorized the Secretary 
to convene a hearing in front of a board of five or more members appointed by the 
Secretary, the affected states, other federal agencies with substantial interests, and any 
affected interstate air pollution agency.  If the hearing board agreed with the Secretary and 
the states continued to refuse to abate the pollution, Section 105 authorized the Secretary 
to ask the Attorney General to initiate legal action. 
The legislative history of the 1965 amendments makes clear there were two 
purposes behind the international air pollution provision: to empower the executive 
branch to prevent U.S. pollution from harming other countries and to give the executive 
branch the authority to “cooperate with foreign countries” in the abatement of air 
pollution and “to seek agreements” with them that would provide “reciprocal benefits” 
for the United States.  According to the Senate report, the international air pollution 
provision was added to the Clean Air Act because: 
there is no provision which would authorize cooperative action with foreign 
countries when air pollution is endangering the health or welfare or their people.  It 
is important that we, in the interest of international amity and in fairness to the 
people of other countries, afford them the benefit of protective measures.17  
In a similar passage, the Senate report states:   
The committee believes that it is important that the Clean Air Act be amended … to 
adopt a procedure whereby we can cooperate with foreign countries in cases 
involving endangerment of health or welfare. … The language of the bill provides 
                                                     
17
 S. Comm. Env’t & Pub. Works, Clean Air Act Amendments and Solid Waste Disposal Act, S. Rep. No. 89-192, at 6 
(1965). 
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for enforcement proceedings to correct international pollution problems originating 
in the United States.18   
The Senate report expressly anticipated that use of the new authorities would lead 
to international air pollution agreements.  In one passage, the Senate report states, 
“International negotiations will be necessary to provide reciprocal benefits for U.S. 
citizens.”19  In another, the report says, “The committee urges the administration to seek 
agreements with Canada and Mexico to help protect U.S. citizens from air pollution 
originating in those countries.”20 
The legislative history in the House evinces a similar intent.21  
In 1970, Congress moved the international air pollution provision to Section 115 of 
the Clean Air Act.22  Then in 1977, Congress made substantive changes to the enforcement 
mechanism in Section 115.  The provision has not been amended since.     
The 1977 amendments converted Section 115 from a primarily procedural provision 
to a substantive one with a proven enforcement mechanism by giving the EPA 
Administrator the authority to require states to revise their state implementation plans to 
abate international air pollution.  Congress took this step because the abatement 
conference was regarded as an ineffective way to achieve emission reductions.  As the 
Senate report stated, “Before 1970 the principal legal means for control or abatement of air 
pollution was the abatement conference procedure … a lengthy and uncertain process in 
which all parties – State, local, and Federal agencies and the polluter – were convened to 
                                                     
18
 Id. at 4. 
19
 Id. at 6. 
20
 Id. at 4. 
21
 H.R. Comm. Interstate & Foreign Com., Clean Air and Solid Waste Disposal Acts, H.R. Rep. No. 89-889, at 6 (1965) 
((“[T]he United States cannot in good conscience decline to protect its neighbors from pollution which is beyond their 
legal control.  Therefore the bill provides remedies for foreign countries adversely affected by air pollution emanating 
from the United States, if reciprocal rights are granted to the United States.”) During floor consideration, Rep. Richard 
McCarthy from New York asked Rep. Oren Harris, the Chairman of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, how the new provision would work “in this instance of pollution emanating from the United States in the 
Buffalo area and going over to Fort Erie in Ontario.” 111 Cong. Rec. H25052 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1965) (colloquy 
between Reps. McCarthy and Harris).  Chairman Harris replied, “before they could proceed to bring about any program 
to deal with the subject they would have to be in agreement for reciprocal treatment.  On the agreement of reciprocity 
there would be inaugurated a program by the Secretary to deal with that particular problem.” Id.  
22
 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604. 
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negotiate a schedule for control of the emissions alleged to cause the problem.”23   In 
comparison, the SIP process was thought to be an effective approach: 
The 1970 amendments … retained in section 115 the conference procedure 
for abatement of … international situations.  The authority of section 115 has 
not been used, and the implementation plan approach for interstate air 
quality control regions has proven to be more successful in dealing with air 
pollution problems involving more than one State.  
In fact, the committee believes that the implementation plan approach is … 
more appropriate than the enforcement conference for international air 
pollution.  Section 115 as revised, therefore, provides that the determination 
that emissions of air pollutants in the United States are endangering the 
health or welfare of citizens of a foreign country will require the State in 
which the source of those emissions is located to revise its implementation 
plan to control those emissions.24 
The House-Senate conference report confirms this understanding of the purpose of 
the amendments.  The conference report shows that both bodies understood that the new 
language in section 115 would give EPA the authority to require SIP revisions to abate 
international air pollution.  According to the conference report, the House concurred in the 
Senate language with amendments that “require a plan revision only to the extent 
necessary to prevent or eliminate the endangerment in the foreign country.”25 
The 1977 amendments to Section 115 made the provision a vastly more effective 
tool for reducing emissions affecting other nations, but they also substantially curtailed the 
procedural engagement provided to foreign countries.  The 1965 right to participate in an 
abatement conference as an equal partner with state air pollution control agencies was 
replaced in 1977 by new language in Section 115(b).  The new language provides only that 
the foreign country “shall be invited to appear at any public hearing associated with any 
                                                     
23
 S. Comm. Env’t & Pub. Works, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, S. Rep. No. 95-127, at 17 (1977).  
24
 Id., at 57.  
25
 H.R. Rep. No. 95-564, at 136 (1977) (Conf. Rep.).  In addition, the House perfecting language modified the 
endangerment finding to reflect the “‘reasonably may be anticipated’ to endanger public health” standard used in other 
parts of the legislation. Id.   
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revision of the appropriate portion of the applicable implementation plan.”26  In effect, the 
1977 amendments downgraded the procedural involvement provided to foreign countries 
by delaying it until after the federal regulations implementing Section 115 have been 
issued, moving the point of engagement to the state level, and giving the comments of the 
foreign countries no more status than those of any member of the public. 
2.3 Judicial Precedent on Section 115 
To date, EPA has sought to invoke Section 115 only once, in the 1980s, in order to 
cooperate with Canada to address the issue of acid rain.   
In 1980, the U.S. and Canada signed a memorandum of intent committing both 
countries to address the problem of acid rain pollution passing between the two 
countries.27  Following this memorandum, Canada added provisions modeled on Section 
115 to its Clean Air Act.28  Under the law, Canadian federal authorities were to identify 
cross-boundary pollution originating in Canada, and could recommend local efforts to 
reduce the pollution or impose federal emission standards.  The law allowed the 
endangered foreign country to participate in the comment process, though with the 
difference that under the Canadian law the foreign country participation occurred at the 
federal, not state or provincial, level.29  Subsequently, in separate letters addressed to the 
                                                     
26
 42 U.S.C. § 7415 (b). 
27
 The memorandum of intent established working groups to address trans-boundary pollution (including acid rain) 
between the countries, and committed the countries to interim actions to develop domestic air pollution control 
measures through new or existing laws and regulations.  Transboundary Air Pollution, Can.-U.S., Aug. 5, 1980, 32 
U.S.T. 2521. 
28
 Clean Air Act, S.C. 1980, c 45, § 21.1(Can.). See also Canada: Amendment of the Clean Air Act to Provide U.S. with 
Legislative Protection Similar to that Offered to Canada under U.S. Clean Air Act, 20 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
MATERIALS 762-768 (May 1981) (“[T]he purpose of the amendments to the Clean Air Act now before the House is to 
provide the United States with essentially the same legislative protection as that offered Canada under section 115 of the 
United States Clean Air Act.”). 
29
 Clean Air Act, S.C. 1980, c 45, § 21.1(Can.). Under the Canadian law, when the Canadian Minister of Environment 
had “reason to believe” that pollution originating in Canada “create[d] or contribute[d]” to air pollution “that may 
reasonably be expected to constitute a significant danger to the health, safety or welfare of persons in a country other 
than Canada,” the Minister would recommend to the Governor in Council (a representative of the federal cabinet), an 
emission standard which he considered “appropriate for the elimination or significant reduction of that danger.” Id.  For 
non-federal sources of pollution, the Minister could recommend emission standards only if the Minister had already 
made reasonable, unsuccessful attempts to get the provincial government to reduce the pollution. Id. The Minister’s 
recommendations would be published prior to implementation, and the foreign country affected by Canadian pollution 
would be given “a reasonable opportunity” to comment on the recommendations, “in a manner prescribed by the 
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Secretary of State and a U.S. Senator, then-EPA Administrator Douglas Costle concluded 
that, although “the detailed procedural and substantive requirements” of the Canadian 
law differed from those of Section 115 and other provisions of the Clean Air Act, the 
Canadian law nonetheless provided “essentially the same rights” as Section 115. 30  
Administrator Costle also issued an endangerment finding in these same letters, 
determining that pollution originating in the U.S. contributed to acid rain pollution in 
Canada. 31   However, EPA Administrators in the incoming Reagan Administration 
declined to take further action under Section 115. 
Subsequent legal challenges based on EPA’s inaction did not lead to significant 
judicial interpretation of Section 115’s requirements.  In one lawsuit, New York and other 
states argued that Administrator Costle’s letter determinations were sufficient to invoke 
Section 115 and that the Reagan Administration was therefore required to call for SIP 
revisions.  In Thomas v. New York, however, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held, 
without addressing the merits of the underlying findings, that the letters did not require 
EPA to take further action because they had been issued without providing an 
opportunity for notice and comment, and without publication in the Federal Register, as 
required by the Administrative Procedure Act for agency rulemaking.32   
In a second lawsuit, Ontario and a number of states and environmental groups 
sought to compel EPA to respond to a petition for rulemaking filed under Section 553(e) of 
the APA.  The petition requested that the agency issue a rule under Section 115 that would 
address sources of pollution in the United States that were contributing to acid rain in 
Canada.33  EPA argued that the agency had not yet made a final decision on the petition, 
that it was still trying to obtain sufficient information to attribute emissions to specific 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Governor in Council.” Id.  The Governor in Council could require pollution sources to adopt the Minister’s emission 
standard, if satisfied that the country endangered by the Canadian pollution provided “essentially the same kind of 
benefits in favour of Canada with respect to abatement or control of air pollution” as those provided by the Canadian 
law. Id.  
30
 New York v. Thomas, 613 F. Supp. 1472, 1486-93 (D.D.C. 1985) (reproducing Administrator Costle’s letters). 
31
 Id.   
32
 See Thomas v. New York, 802 F.2d 1443, 1446-48 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
33
 Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario v. EPA, 912 F.2d 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
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states, and that Section 115 allowed the agency to address endangerment, reciprocity, and 
SIP revisions in a unitary proceeding, rather than in a segmented one.  The D.C. Circuit 
found EPA’s interpretation reasonable, holding that the agency was not required to issue 
formal endangerment or reciprocity findings until it had the information necessary to trace 
pollution to particular states, and that its decision that it did not yet have that information 
was not arbitrary and capricious.34 
This sparse history illustrates two important points: First, the endangerment and 
reciprocity findings required by Section 115, along with the call for SIP revisions to abate 
the international pollution, require notice-and-comment rulemaking consistent with the 
requirements of Section 553 of the APA.  Second, both EPA and the D.C. Circuit have been 
of the view that EPA has ample discretion to interpret and apply the provisions of Section 
115 to address international air pollution.35 
3. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR REGULATING GREENHOUSE GASES 
UNDER SECTION 115 
To invoke Section 115 to regulate GHG emissions, EPA would need (1) to find that 
U.S. emissions of GHGs are endangering other nations and (2) to determine that other 
nations have provided reciprocal protections to the U.S.  After discussing the relevant 
standard of review, this part examines whether EPA could make these showings for 
GHGs.  The part concludes by addressing potential arguments that Section 115 cannot be 
used to regulate GHGs, including the argument that Section 110 can be applied only to 
criteria air pollutants.  
                                                     
34
 Id., at 1533-34. 
35
 Notably, unlike in the case of Her Majesty the Queen here EPA does possess state-specific greenhouse gas emissions 
data.  See  U.S. EPA, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990–2013, 430-R-15-004 (2015). 
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3.1 The Standard of Review for Potential EPA Action under Section 115 
Under existing canons of statutory interpretation and well-established 
administrative law doctrines, EPA should have significant discretion to interpret 
ambiguous terms in Section 115 and to make factual findings about its application to 
international air pollution that contributes to climate change.  Two primary legal 
frameworks would govern EPA’s application of Section 115: judicial review of agency 
legal interpretations under Chevron v. NRDC, 36 and judicial review of agency fact-finding 
and policy decisions under the arbitrary and capricious standard set forth in the APA.37   
Under the standard set forth in Chevron v. NRDC, agency interpretations of 
ambiguous statutory provisions are accorded significant deference as long as they are 
“reasonable.”38  The U.S. Supreme Court has reaffirmed Chevron’s principal of deference 
in three recent Clean Air Act cases.  The first case, EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, 
involved the “good neighbor” provision of the Clean Air Act, which regulates cross-
border pollution within the United States.39  The Court found that EPA’s definition of the 
“amounts” of pollution from upwind states that “contribute significantly” to 
nonattainment in downwind states was reasonable and entitled to significant deference.40  
The second case, Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, involved EPA’s interpretations of the 
Prevention of Significant Deterioration provisions of the Act and their applicability to 
different sources of GHG emissions. 41   There, the Court found that some of EPA’s 
interpretations represented an unwarranted expansion of EPA’s authority to emissions 
sources that previously were not regulated under the Act, and were impermissible under 
its plain meaning, and that other interpretations that pertained to sources already covered 
under the Act were permissible.  On both points the Court applied the Chevron analysis.42  
                                                     
36
 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
37
 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2012). 
38
 Chevron, 467 U.S. 837. 
39
 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i). 
40
 EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, 134 S.Ct. 1584 (2014). 
41
 Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S.Ct. 2427 (2014). 
42
 Id., at 2439. 
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Finally, Michigan v. EPA involved the Court’s review of EPA’s interpretation of language 
in Section 112 of the Act requiring the agency to establish standards for hazardous air 
pollutants where the agency finds such regulation “appropriate and necessary.”43  The 
Court again applied Chevron, and a five-judge majority found EPA’s interpretation, which 
excluded costs from the consideration of whether regulation is “appropriate,” 
unreasonable.44   
Final rules issued under the Clean Air Act are also reviewed according to the 
arbitrary and capricious standard of the APA.45  Under this standard, a court will set aside 
agency action only if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.”46  The “arbitrary and capricious” standard deems the agency action 
presumptively valid provided the action meets a minimum rationality standard. 47  In 
applying the standard, courts look to determine whether the agency has considered the 
relevant factors and articulated a rational connection between the facts found and the 
choices made.48  This standard of review gives EPA significant deference, particularly 
where a decision involves EPA’s unique expertise.49   
                                                     
43
 Michigan v. EPA, 135 S.Ct. 2699 (2015). 
44
 Id., at 2708. Some commentators have argued that the trajectory of Supreme Court Clean Air Act decisions, 
combined with the Supreme Court’s decision in King v. Burwell, indicates a shift in the degree of deference the 
Supreme Court is willing to afford agency decisions, especially EPA decisions.  See e.g., Jonathan R. Nash, Michigan v. 
EPA and the Future of Chevron Deference, THE HILL (July 16, 2015), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/the-
judiciary/248040-michigan-v-epa-and-the-future-of-chevron-deference. However, empirical studies of the Court’s 
application of Chevron and other deference regimes reveal that the Court has never applied the test uniformly, see 
Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr.,Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What 
Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727 (2010), and that while there are positive 
correlations between agency win rates and both the application of Chevron and comparative agency expertise there have 
always been instances in which agencies lose.  See William N. Eskridge Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of 
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 
(2007).   Regardless, the Chevron doctrine remains the go-to framework for analysis, directing courts to uphold 
reasonable agency interpretations in instances where the statute is silent or ambiguous. 
45
 NRDC v. EPA, 194 F.3d 130, 136 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A)). 
46
 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).   
47
 NRDC v. EPA, 194 F.3d at 136 (citing Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 520-21 
(D.C. Cir. 1983)). 
48
 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
49
 See NRDC v. EPA, 194 F.3d at 136 (“While we carefully review the factual record, we will give due deference to the 
agency especially when the agency action involves evaluating complex scientific or statistical data within the agency's 
expertise.”).  See also Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87 (1983).  
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Courts often apply both the Chevron and the arbitrary and capricious frameworks 
where agency action requires the agency to interpret statutory authority.50  Because of the 
discretion accorded under these frameworks, EPA should have substantial legal room to 
issue an endangerment finding, to make a reciprocity determination, and to issue a call for 
states to revise their SIPs in order to reduce GHG emissions from within their jurisdictions. 
3.2 The Endangerment Finding  
The first prerequisite to EPA action under Section 115 is the endangerment finding.  
Under Section 115(a), this finding requires that the Administrator “has reason to believe,” 
based on “reports, surveys or studies from any duly constituted international agency,” 
that air pollutants emitted in the United States “cause or contribute to air pollution which 
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health of welfare in a foreign country.”51  
This section analyzes whether EPA has a legal basis for making an endangerment finding 
under Section 115.  
Perhaps the strongest overall argument in favor of EPA’s issuing an international 
endangerment finding for domestic GHG emissions under Section 115 is that the agency 
has already made an endangerment finding for GHGs under Clean Air Act Section 202(a).  
As noted above, the language in Section 115 is nearly identical to that of Section 202(a), 
under which EPA issued an endangerment finding for greenhouse gases in 2009.52  In that 
rulemaking, EPA defined six GHGs as a single air pollutant to be measured in carbon 
dioxide equivalent (CO2e) units, considered the scientific evidence on the linkages 
between carbon dioxide levels and global warming, and concluded that motor-vehicle 
emissions of GHGs “contribute to the total greenhouse gas air pollution, and thus to the 
                                                     
50
 See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S.Ct. at 2706-07 (finding agency interpretation impermissible and that agency failed to 
take into account all the relevant factors); Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario v. EPA, 912 F.2d 1525, 1535 
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (finding EPA decision declining to issue Section 115 findings due to its interpretation of the statute’s 
procedures to be both reasonable under Chevron and not arbitrary and capricious). 
51
 42 U.S.C. § 7415(a) (2012).  In addition, as noted above, an endangerment finding may be triggered by a request from 
the Secretary of State. Id.   
52
 Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 
74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009).   
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climate change problem, which is reasonably anticipated to endanger public health and 
welfare.”53  The 202(a) endangerment finding was challenged in court, and upheld in its 
entirety by the D.C. Circuit.54   
Even without the precedent under Section 202(a), the individual elements of a 
Section 115 endangerment determination are all easily satisfied.  First, the EPA 
Administrator is in receipt of “reports, surveys and studies from [a] duly constituted 
international agency” that support an endangerment finding.  The Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)—whose comprehensive 2007 Fourth Assessment Report 
was used to support EPA’s Section 202(a) endangerment finding,55 and whose subsequent 
Fifth Assessment Report demonstrates increasing certainty regarding the extraordinary 
adverse impacts on public health and welfare climate change has begun to and is likely to 
continue to inflict56—undoubtedly constitutes a “duly constituted international agency.”57  
The IPCC was established by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the 
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) in 1988, and subsequently endorsed by the 
United Nations General Assembly and charged by it with the mandate “to provide 
internationally co-ordinated scientific assessments of the magnitude, timing and potential 
environmental and socio-economic impact of climate change and realistic response 
strategies.”58  A United Nations body, open to all member countries of the WMO and 
UNEP and in which the United States actively participates, the IPCC is recognized as the 
most authoritative voice on the scientific and technical issues involved with climate 
                                                     
53
 Id., at 66,499. 
54
 Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (2012), aff’d Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 
S.Ct. 2427 (2014),  
55
 See 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,497. 
56
 See generally IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUPS I, II AND III 
TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (Core Writing Team, 
R.K. Pachauri & L.A. Meyer eds., 2014). 
57
 See Thomas v. New York, 802 F.2d 1443, 1445 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (International Joint Commission established by U.S. 
and Canada “concededly a ‘duly constituted international body’”).  See also Hannah Chang, Cap-and-Trade Under The 
Clean Air Act?: Rethinking Section 115, COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. FIELD REPORTS 2010, at 14; Roger Martella and Matthew 
Paulson, Regulation of Greenhouse Gases under Section 115 of the Clean Air Act, DAILY ENVIRONMENT REPORT, Mar. 
9 2009, at 7.. 
58
 G.A. Res. 43/53 (Dec. 6, 1988).  
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change, and has, in effect, become the scientific arm of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change.59 
Second, there is no question that “air pollutants” emitted in the United States 
“cause or contribute to air pollution” in foreign countries.  The U.S. Supreme Court found 
in Massachusetts v. EPA that GHGs are “air pollutants” under the Clean Air Act.60  The 
GHGs at issue here are, by definition, emitted in the United States.61  And these domestic 
emissions cause or contribute to pollution beyond U.S. borders because CO2 and the other 
greenhouse gases become “well-mixed” in the atmosphere and affect global climate.62  As 
EPA has explained, “U.S. emissions have climatic effects not only in the United States but 
in all parts of the world.”63 
Third, this air pollution endangers public health and welfare in countries around 
the world. 64   The public health effects of climate change have become more clearly 
understood in recent years.65  According to the IPCC, climate change threatens public 
health directly, through changes in temperature and precipitation and occurrence of heat 
                                                     
59
 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/bodies/body/6444.php (“The COP receives the outputs of the IPCC and uses IPCC data and 
information as a baseline on the state of knowledge on climate change in making science based decisions.”).  See also 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 508-510 (2007) (citing IPCC reports). 
60
 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 528-29. 
61
 U.S. EPA, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990–2013, 430-R-15-004 (2015),. 
62
 See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air 
Act, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,536-66,540 (Dec. 15, 2009). See also id., at 66,540 (mobile sources comprising 4.3 percent 
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waves, floods, droughts, and fires.66  The IPCC also explains that climate change may have 
indirect health impacts, as health may be negatively impacted by crop failures, shifting 
patterns of disease vectors, or other ecological disruptions brought on by climate change.67  
Social responses to climate change, such as forced displacement due to sea level rise or 
drought, may also produce public health impacts.68  
The IPCC’s latest report also makes clear that climate change threatens numerous 
adverse impacts on the welfare of people living in other countries.  These include 
increased frequency and severity of extreme weather events and climate-related disasters; 
pervasive impacts on critical infrastructure, including energy systems and transportation 
networks; disruptions to food production; degradation of ecosystems; threats to domestic 
and international security; and displacement.69  Indeed, climate change poses an existential 
threat to small island states and many coastal areas that are at risk of inundation due to 
rising seas and is expected to make some areas uninhabitable due to drought, heat, or the 
inability to produce adequate food.70   
In sum, the IPCC concludes that “it is extremely likely that human influence has 
been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century,” and that 
“[c]ontinued emissions of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and changes in all 
components of the climate system,” exacerbating these and other harms.71  Given the 
statements made by the IPCC and EPA, and the deference given these scientific 
determinations by the U.S. Supreme Court, there can be no question that GHGs emitted in 
the United States contribute to a global pollution problem that endangers public health 
and welfare in other countries.  
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3.3 The Reciprocity Determination 
In order to invoke its authority under Section 115, the EPA Administrator must also 
determine that an endangered foreign country gives the United States “essentially the 
same rights with respect to the prevention or control” of its own air pollution as are 
provided to the foreign country by Section 115.72  The phrasing in this provision provides 
significant interpretive latitude to EPA.  Nonetheless, one may anticipate that there will be 
legal challenges to a Section 115 reciprocity determination.  Accordingly, this section 
addresses five issues that may arise in the course of judicial review: (1) the number of 
foreign nations with which reciprocity needs to be established; (2) the form of the 
reciprocal rights granted by foreign nations; (3) the procedural rights foreign nations must 
provide to the United States; (4) the substantive commitments the foreign nations must 
make; and (5) the ways in which the U.S. can ensure foreign nations’ continued 
compliance. 
3.3.1 The Number of Nations 
The language of Section 115 clearly anticipates that EPA may make a reciprocity 
finding in relation to a single foreign country.  Indeed, in the only instance in which EPA 
has invoked Section 115 it did so with just one country, Canada, to address acid rain.  For 
this reason, EPA could credibly argue that an agreement or shared commitment made 
with a single nation—even a small island nation facing the threat of vanishing under sea 
level rise—could provide a basis for a reciprocity finding.73   
Climate change, however, is a global problem caused by global emissions of GHGs, 
with different countries bearing different degrees of responsibility for those emissions.  
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Accordingly, one can anticipate that opponents to a Section 115 rulemaking will challenge 
a reciprocity determination based on the number—and identity—of the countries 
involved.  While EPA may have legal authority to base a reciprocity determination upon 
action by a single country, its determination will be less susceptible to challenge if it 
involves multiple nations. 
As discussed above, the legislative history of Section 115 indicates that the section 
was enacted to “authorize cooperative action with foreign countries” and to create “a 
procedure whereby we can cooperate with foreign countries in cases involving 
endangerment of health or welfare.”74  The Senate report explains that an important goal 
of this cooperative action should be to ensure that the other nations act to protect U.S. air 
quality, stating that “[i]nternational negotiations would be necessary to provide reciprocal 
benefits for U.S. citizens.”75  These references in the legislative history evince the intent to 
empower the executive branch to reach mutually beneficial understandings with foreign 
countries concerning international air pollution.  In fact, the State Department has been 
pursuing just such an outcome through negotiations and activities under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and in bilateral 
negotiations with China and other countries.  
This concept of “reciprocal benefits,” as described in the Senate report, can provide 
a touchstone EPA could use to evaluate the number of countries needed to justify a 
reciprocity determination.  Reciprocal arrangements with one or more other nations that 
emit, individually or collectively, a significant quantity of GHGs would provide the U.S. 
with benefits comparable to those that the U.S. would be providing to the other nations.  
That would appear to achieve the mutual benefit Congress intended, even if the exact 
quantity of emissions reductions is not equal. 
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There are multiple configurations of countries that could meet this test.  First and 
foremost, the 195 parties to the UNFCCC should surpass any minimal requirement.  At the 
time of this writing, nearly 190 countries have made emissions reductions pledges through 
the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions process at the UNFCCC, accounting 
for over 93% of current global GHG emissions.76  A reciprocity determination premised on 
the mutual benefits to accrue through that process would appear to be beyond challenge.   
Alternatively, a lesser number of countries could also deliver reciprocal benefits.  
As of 2011, the top three global emitters contributed more than 50 percent of global GHG 
emissions: China emitted 29 percent, the U.S. emitted 16 percent, and the European Union 
emitted 11 percent.77  Reciprocal action among the U.S., China, and the EU to address 
climate change would certainly provide mutual benefits to all three partners.  As another 
example, the combined greenhouse gas emissions of the EU, Canada, and Mexico in 2011 
nearly equaled the emissions from the United States, making them also a potentially 
sufficient grouping for demonstrating mutual benefit.78    
In general, the larger the percentage of the world’s emissions encompassed in 
reciprocal arrangements, the more difficult it will be for opponents to dispute a reciprocity 
determination.  Yet Section 115 reciprocity should be met even if some nations “free ride” 
on the actions of the U.S. and its partners in reciprocity.  Nothing in the language of 
Section 115 requires universal action to combat a pollution problem.  If EPA can 
demonstrate that there is mutual benefit deriving from the actions of the U.S. and its 
partner nations, Section 115 reciprocity should rest on a solid foundation. 
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3.3.2 The Form of Foreign Reciprocal Undertakings 
Section 115 does not specify any particular form that foreign commitments would 
need to take in order to serve as the basis for a reciprocity determination.  The language of 
the provision does not require legislation or regulation to be adopted by a foreign country, 
nor does it require a binding agreement with the United States.  As a result, under Chevron, 
EPA would be afforded considerable deference to find reciprocal protections through a 
variety of foreign reductions and commitments.   
One way reciprocal commitments could be embodied would be through a global 
treaty.  Even prior to the decisions adopted in Paris in December 2015, the UNFCCC 
included procedural provisions that give the U.S. an opportunity to review and question 
the climate plans of other nations.  As discussed below, these provisions could provide a 
foundation for finding that the procedural component of the reciprocity requirement is 
satisfied. 
Less binding commitments, including political commitments, should also suffice.  
For example, under the UNFCCC process, countries have submitted non-binding Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs).  The INDCs indicate the level of emissions 
reductions countries intend to achieve in the post-2020 period, and the domestic measures 
the countries intend to implement to achieve those reductions.79  As of the time of this 
writing, 160 INDCs have been submitted, representing 187 countries and covering well 
over 90% of anthropogenic GHG emissions.80  As discussed below, these pledges should 
be a sufficient basis for finding that the substantive component of the reciprocity 
requirement is satisfied.   
Moreover, bilateral commitments, whether legally binding or political 
commitments, could also be a basis for a reciprocity determinations, as is also discussed 
below.  
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In the acid rain context, Administrator Costle found reciprocity without any 
commitment by Canada at all.  Instead, he based his reciprocity finding on Canada’s legal 
authority to act and willingness to provide comparable pollution control protections to the 
U.S.81  This indicates that domestic legislation or regulation in foreign countries that is 
designed to achieve GHG emissions reductions —such as that enacted by the European 
Union and its member states—could also be a sufficient basis for reciprocity 
determinations.  
3.3.3 Procedural Reciprocity 
The reciprocity requirement in Section 115(c) states that a foreign country must 
provide the U.S. with “essentially the same rights with respect to the prevention or control 
of air pollution as is given that country by this section.”  The only express right given to a 
foreign nation in Section 115 is the procedural right to attend state public hearings in 
Section 115(b), which provides that “[a]ny foreign country so affected by such emission of 
pollutant or pollutants shall be invited to appear at any public hearing associated with any 
revision of the appropriate portion of the applicable implementation plan.”82     
This procedural right is not an extensive one.  Foreign nations would likely more 
highly value a right to influence the degree of emission reductions undertaken in the 
United States.  As a result of the 1977 amendments, however, Section 115 provides no right 
to foreign nations to participate in decisions about the level of emission reductions to be 
achieved by the United States as a whole or by any individual state.83  Rather, the right to 
comment in Section 115(b) occurs later in the process: when the states are developing their 
plans for achieving the emission reductions assigned to the states by EPA.   
EPA’s implementing regulation on state public hearings specifies the minimum 
notice required (30 days), how the notice must be given (by prominent advertisement in 
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the area affected), and recordkeeping requirements (such as maintaining a list of witnesses 
and the text of each presentation). 84   The regulation also specifies that the EPA 
Administrator must be notified through the appropriate regional office, which means that 
EPA would have notice of the hearing and could in turn notify the affected foreign 
country.  Neither the statute nor the regulation, however, specify what the right “to 
appear” entails.  Presumably, it would include the right to make a comment on the 
proposed revision to the SIP.  There is no obligation, however, for the state to give any 
comments by the foreign nation any more weight than a comment by a member of the 
general public.85 
It is possible that EPA could simplify or centralize foreign engagement in the 
hearing process.  The public hearing regulation gives states the option of avoiding a public 
hearing if no one requests one.86  In a similar way, EPA might be able to give foreign 
nations the option of submitting comments through EPA or the State Department to be 
forwarded to the states if the foreign nations agree. 
In the acid rain precedent, EPA determined that procedural reciprocity existed 
where Canada had adopted a procedure that provided the U.S. with an equivalent or 
greater opportunity for engagement than the right to appear at a state public hearing 
contained in Section 115(b).  In that case, Canada’s law gave the U.S. the opportunity to 
comment on Canada’s proposed national response, not it province-level implementation.  
EPA found that Canada did not have to follow “the detailed procedural … requirements 
applicable to the State plan revision process under the U.S. Clean Air Act” because “[t]he 
Canadian requirement for federal consultation and efforts to procure provincial action fills 
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the same role as the State plan revision process in the U.S. system.” 87   As this 
administrative precedent suggests, the test for procedural reciprocity should be a practical 
one that requires an opportunity for procedural engagement while respecting differences 
in regulatory approaches. 
Thus, so long as a country accords the United States an avenue for involvement that 
is at least roughly equal to the participatory rights accorded to foreign countries by Section 
115, EPA could reasonably determine that the United States has received “essentially the 
same” procedural rights.  This condition could be met through a number of different 
mechanisms: through the UNFCCC, through bilateral agreements that provide 
opportunities for nation-to-nation engagement, or through the domestic law of a foreign 
country that accords participatory rights to interested parties under conditions similar to 
U.S. administrative law.   
To illustrate how this analysis could proceed, this section examines the arguments 
for procedural reciprocity in relation to the UNFCCC, China, the EU, and Canada and 
Mexico. 
1. The UNFCCC  
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change provides a 
mechanism for establishing procedural reciprocity with nearly every country in the world 
-- both under the procedures currently in effect and even more so under the enhanced 
procedures adopted at the Paris Conference of the Parties (COP) in December 2015. 
The current UNFCCC rules have reporting and review procedures called 
International Assessment and Review (IAR) for developed countries listed in Annex I of 
the Convention and International Consultation and Analysis (ICA) for non-Annex I 
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countries.88  These procedures provide the United States with regular opportunities to 
review and question the climate mitigation plans of other nations, including at public 
sessions at UNFCCC meetings.89  EPA could reasonably determine that these procedures 
give the United States “essentially the same rights” as the public hearing requirement in 
Section 115. 
The case for reciprocity is strongest with other Annex I nations because there is an 
extensive review and assessment process for these developed countries under the current 
UNFCCC rules.  Under IAR procedures, each Annex I country submits a “biennial report” 
that quantifies the nation’s emissions and describes its plans for achieving economy-wide 
emission reductions.90  These reports are reviewed by a panel of technical experts and 
subject to a “multilateral assessment” that gives all other nations a chance to review the 
report, submit written questions, and attend and ask questions at a public presentation by 
the nation at a UNFCCC meeting.91  The public session at the UNFCCC meeting is a close 
analogue to the public hearing provided for under Section 115.  The review by technical 
experts, the ability to submit written questions, and the biennial nature of the process 
provide additional opportunities for input beyond the minimal requirements of Section 
115. 
Reciprocity should also exist with non-Annex I countries under the ICA process.  
The  ICA process for these developing countries is a “lite” version of the IAR process for 
Annex I nations.  The reporting requirements are less demanding; the public presentation 
by the non-Annex I country occurs in a less formal setting; and the review is supposed to 
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be “facilitative” and avoid discussion of “the appropriateness of … domestic policies and 
measures.”92  Nonetheless, the process retains the technical review, the opportunity to 
submit written questions, and the chance to raise questions at a public session, which 
could be the basis for a finding of procedural reciprocity.93 
In December 2015 in Paris, the world adopted a new agreement that calls for “an 
enhanced transparency framework.” 94   The details of the new framework are to be 
developed in “modalities, procedures and guidelines” adopted at a future UNFCCC 
meeting.95  When fully implemented, the enhanced framework will further strengthen the 
case for procedural reciprocity. 
One key change made in the Paris Agreement will be the elimination of the 
bifurcated system of review whereby developed nations are subject to one set of 
procedures and developing countries are subject to a different set.  Under the new 
approach, both developed nations like the United States and major developing nations like 
China will undergo review in a single set of procedures.  The new transparency 
framework provides flexibility in implementation, but only “to those developing countries 
that need it in the light of their capacities.”96   
The new framework also eliminates the limitation on considering the 
appropriateness of developing countries’ domestic measures.  To the contrary, the Paris 
Agreement expressly provides that the review “shall … identify areas of improvement” 
for every country in “its implementation and achievement of its nationally determined 
contribution” to reducing GHG emissions.97  The Paris Agreement also provides that “each 
Party shall participate in a facilitative, multilateral consideration of progress with respect 
to … its respective implementation and achievement of its nationally determined 
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contribution.”98  This facilitative, multilateral process will provide the U.S. an opportunity 
to evaluate and comment upon the emission reduction plans of other nations. 
Other significant improvements in the Paris Agreement include the requirement 
that nations regularly update their emission reduction pledges. Under the Paris 
Agreement and the COP Decision adopting it, each Party to the UNFCCC will be required 
to “prepare, communicate and maintain” successive Nationally Determined Contributions 
(NDCs), and to implement domestic mitigation measures with the aim of achieving 
emissions reduction targets in the NDCs.99  UNFCCC Parties will be expected to submit 
their first NDCs in 2020, and successive NDCs every five years thereafter, at least 9-12 
months in advance of the relevant COP.100  Parties are expected to provide information in 
the NDC to facilitate “clarity, transparency and understanding of the contributions.” 101  
The UNFCCC Secretariat will prepare a synthesis evaluating the cumulative effect of the 
emissions reduction commitments in the NDCs. 102   Beginning in 2023 the COP will 
periodically assess collective progress towards achieving the purpose of the Agreement 
(including emissions reductions).  This “global stocktake” is to inform the subsequent 
NDCs of Parties.103 
In summary, the Paris Agreement establishes an ongoing cycle of “enhanced 
transparency” where countries will communicate successive emissions reduction 
commitments, including information about the domestic measures that implement those 
commitments.  Other countries will have multiple opportunities to review and have input 
on those emissions reduction commitments both before and after they are submitted.  This 
ongoing opportunity for review and input should far exceed the procedural rights 
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provided by the opportunity to appear at a public hearing and comment on a SIP revision, 
as contemplated by 115.  
2. China 
Even absent the multilateral process through the U.N., EPA should be able to find 
sufficient procedural reciprocity with other nations.  For example, the U.S. and China, the 
world’s largest emitter, have long engaged in formal and informal collaboration on a 
variety of environmental issues, especially climate change.104  In recent years, the two 
nations have reached agreements that provide opportunities for each to understand and 
comment on the other’s climate policies.  They also regularly discuss climate policies at the 
highest levels of government.  Taken together, the agreements and the regular discussions 
provide a firm foundation for finding procedural reciprocity. 
In July 2009, the United States and China entered into a “Memorandum of 
Understanding to Enhance Cooperation on Climate Change, Energy and Environment.”105  
The MOU creates a bilateral “Climate Change Policy Dialogue” to “promote discussion 
and exchange of views on domestic strategies and policies for addressing climate 
change.”106  The following year, in October 2010, the U.S. EPA and China’s Ministry of 
Environmental Protection entered into a “Memorandum of Understanding on Scientific 
and Technical Cooperation in the Field of Environment.”107  This MOU calls specifically for 
“cooperation to strengthen the development, implementation and enforcement of 
environmental laws.”108  Then in April 2013, the United States and China agreed to create a 
U.S.-China Climate Change Working Group “to spur large-scale cooperative efforts to 
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address climate change,” which has become “the premier vehicle for U.S.-China 
cooperation on climate change.” 109   These agreements give the United States better 
opportunities for influencing China’s climate policies than the opportunity to participate 
in a public hearing required by Section 115. 
The practice of the two nations shows that there is in fact an active dialogue on 
climate at the highest levels of government.  As part of an “Enhanced Policy Dialogue” 
under the Climate Change Working Group, senior officials in the United States and China 
have met multiple times to discuss the two countries’ post-2020 plans for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions, engaging in “detailed conversation about the domestic policies 
of each side.”110  In June 2015, the two nations created a new “Domestic Policy Dialogue” 
within the Climate Change Working Group “to share information on domestic policy 
goals, plans, challenges, and successes.”111  Areas where there is active collaborative effort 
underway include phasing down hydroflourocarbons, a potent GHG; reducing vehicle 
emissions; smart grids; carbon capture, utilization and storage; collection of GHG 
emissions data, and energy efficiency.112  Moreover, the leaders of the two nations have 
met in both the United States and China to announce major climate initiatives.  At the 
meeting in China in November 2014, the leaders made historic climate reduction pledges 
and said they would “continue strengthening their policy dialogue and practical 
cooperation.”113   
In addition, evaluation of “foreign” input is already a standard part of the Chinese 
policymaking process, and the U.S. is one of the leading sources of foreign involvement.  
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Indeed, many laws, policies, and regulations in China are now posted to the public for 
comment as a matter of course.114 
China has a different system of government than the United States.  But there is no 
language in Section 115 that requires fundamental changes in the form of a foreign 
country’s government.  Instead, the procedural reciprocity requirement of Section 115 
should be interpreted in the context of the nations involved.  Under Section 115, China has 
to provide the United States with an equivalent opportunity to provide input, but it does 
not need to become a constitutional democracy.  The requirements of procedural 
reciprocity should be satisfied by the multiple avenues for input into China’s climate 
policies that its bilateral agreements with the U.S. provide.   
3. The EU 
The European Union is the world’s third largest emitter of GHGs, and a global 
leader in undertaking measures to mitigate climate change.  The “general principles and 
minimum standards” for consultation in the EU allow the United States and other nations 
to participate in the development of its climate policies by filing comments.115  In fact, the 
U.S. has used this process to submit comments on proposed EU environmental policies.116  
This procedural right to comment resembles the right that Section 115 provides foreign 
countries, except that it occurs at the EU level and has an even broader scope than Section 
115 because it applies to legislative and regulatory proposals. 
In addition, there are multiple forums—both bilateral and multilateral—available to 
the United States to discuss climate policy directly with the EU officials.  The bilateral 
forums include leader-to-leader summits that discuss climate change, the U.S.-EU Energy 
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Council, and the Transatlantic Economic Council.117  The multilateral forums include the 
Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate and the Clean Energy Ministerial. 118  
Taken together, the EU consultation standards and the bilateral and multilateral forums 
provide a substantial opportunity for input in EU climate policies, certainly at least as 
much as foreign countries receive through section 115’s public hearing requirement.  This 
provides a sound basis for concluding that procedural reciprocity already exists with the 
EU.  
4. Canada and Mexico 
Two countries are specifically mentioned in the 1965 legislative history creating the 
international air pollution provision:  Canada and Mexico.  During floor consideration, the 
Chairman of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, Rep. Oren Harris, 
said that the bill would give the Administration a mechanism to address “air pollution 
adversely affecting persons in Mexico or Canada.”119  A passage in the House Report refers 
to protecting “neighboring countries.”120  The Senate Report urged “the administration to 
seek agreements with Canada and Mexico to help protect U.S. citizens from air pollution 
originating in those countries.”121 
These references to Canada and Mexico are unlikely to lead to a judicial 
interpretation that reciprocal relationships can occur only with these two countries as the 
statutory language is written more broadly to apply to any “foreign country.”  In the case 
of both countries, however, there is a strong case that procedural reciprocity already exists. 
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As a matter of law, Article 4 of the 1993 North American Agreement on 
Environmental Cooperation between Canada, Mexico, and the United States provides that 
“[t]o the extent possible, each Party shall: (a) publish in advance any [environmental] 
measure it proposes to adopt; and (b) provide … Parties a reasonable opportunity to 
comment on such proposed measures.”122  Subsequent regulatory cooperation agreements 
have repeated and broadened these requirements. 123   This right to notice of and 
opportunity to comment on environmental measures in Canada and Mexico should give 
the United States “essentially the same” ability, if not a greater one, to influence Canadian 
and Mexican policy as Canada and Mexico would have to influence U.S. policy by 
appearing at public hearings under Section 115. 
In practice and as a result of subsequent bilateral and trilateral agreements, Canada, 
Mexico, and the United States routinely extend extensive opportunities to discuss and 
comment on their climate policies.  These opportunities include (1) face-to-face discussions 
at the leader level;124 (2) strategic planning to address climate change by the heads of each 
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country’s environmental agency through the Commission on Environmental 
Cooperation;125 (3) a Clean Energy Dialogue with Canada,126 a Bilateral Clean Energy and 
Climate Change Task Force with Mexico, 127 and a newly announced North American 
Energy Ministers’ Working Group on Climate Change and Energy led by the countries’ 
respective energy secretaries;128 and (4) efforts to harmonize important climate regulations, 
including vehicle and appliance standards and power plant rules.129 
As with the case of China and the EU, these many opportunities for the U.S. to 
participate in the formulation of climate policy in Canada and Mexico should be sufficient 
to establish procedural reciprocity with the countries.    
3.3.4 Substantive Reciprocity 
In addition to the procedural requirement that transverses Sections 115(b) and (c), 
the requirement that a foreign country provide the U.S. with “essentially the same rights 
with respect to the prevention or control of air pollution” may also be interpreted to 
mandate some commitment by partner nations to substantive reductions in GHG pollution 
within their borders.  Without substantive action by the foreign country, the United States 
would not receive the “reciprocal benefit” envisioned by Congress when it enacted the 
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international air pollution provision in 1965.130  As with other aspects of Section 115, given 
the statutory ambiguity and the high degree of technical expertise required, a court would 
accord significant deference to EPA’s determination of the level of substantive 
commitment necessary to establish reciprocity.   
There are a number of legally defensible bases for an EPA substantive reciprocity 
determination.  At a foundational level, all countries already provide a degree of 
substantive reciprocity to the U.S. under the international law principle of sic utere tuo ut 
alienum non laedus, which directs nations to avoid causing significant injuries to the 
environment of other nations. 131   This principle was most recently upheld by the 
International Court of Justice in the Pulp Mills case, where the ICJ clarified that, as a matter 
of customary international law, it is “every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its 
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.”132 Specifically, the ICJ 
noted that there is a “principle of prevention” that requires a state to “use all the means at 
its disposal in order to avoid activities which take place in its territory, or in any area 
under its jurisdiction, causing significant damage to the environment of another State.”133  
The member states of the UNFCCC committed in 1992 to provide an additional 
degree of substantive reciprocity to each other.134  Under the terms of that treaty, member 
states have committed to the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
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climate system.”135  More specifically, the 195 parties to the convention have committed—
while “taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and their 
specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances”136—to, 
among other things, “[f]ormulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and, 
where appropriate, regional programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change 
by addressing anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks.”137   
In the negotiations leading up the December 2015 UNFCCC Conference of the 
Parties in Paris, nations took further steps to commit to comparable efforts, taking into 
account national circumstances and respective capabilities.  These commitments are 
embodied in the INDCs that nations submitted, and that will be implemented under the 
terms of the Paris Agreement.  China, the world’s largest emitter, pledged to peak its 
emissions around 2030 and to increase its share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy 
consumption to around 20 percent by the same year.138  The U.S., the world’s second 
largest emitter, pledged to reduce GHG emissions by 26-28 percent below 2005 levels by 
2025, and to make best efforts to reduce emissions by 28 percent.139  The EU, the world’s 
third largest emitter, pledged to reduce domestic GHG emissions by 40% by 2030 
compared to a 1990 baseline year, consistent with its own goal to reduce emissions by 80-
95 percent by 2050.140  And India, the world’s fourth largest emitter, pledged to increase its 
share of non-fossil-based power capacity from 30 percent today to about 40 percent by 
2030 with the help of international support; to reduce its emissions intensity per unit of 
GDP by 33-35 percent below 2005 levels by 2030; and to create an additional carbon sink of 
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2.5 to 3 billion tons of carbon dioxide through additional tree cover. 141   Many other 
countries have made their own pledges.142   
Section 115 does not prescribe how EPA should assess these pledges, and there are 
multiple ways EPA could do so.  The IPCC has identified seven “effort-sharing” 
approaches for fairly allocating emission reduction obligations among nations.  These 
approaches are (1) “responsibility,” which would apportion emission reductions based on 
a country’s historical emissions; (2) “capability,” which would apportion emission 
reductions based on a measure of a country’s ability to pay; (3) “equality,” which would 
apportion emission reductions based on per-capita emissions; (4) “equal marginal 
abatement costs,” which would apportion emission reductions based on a measure of 
reduction costs; and (5) three additional approaches that are combinations of the 
responsibility, capability, and equality approaches.143  Other approaches have looked at 
metrics that compare emissions to a past baseline, to a future baseline representing 
“business as usual” emissions, or to a measure of emissions intensity per unit of GDP.144  
Depending on the approach used, different countries’ pledges will look more or less 
ambitious.  It would be eminently reasonable for EPA to look to the relative commitments 
of each country measured from a variety of perspectives and to take into account 
differences in national circumstances in determining whether they are making comparable 
efforts.     
An evaluation of the INDCs and related commitments of China and the EU 
illustrates how EPA could determine that substantive reciprocity exists for both of them.  
Similar approaches could be used for other nations. 
1. China 
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Its high levels of GHG emissions make China a difficult country to ignore in present 
and future climate change response efforts and a prime target for a Section 115 reciprocity 
finding.  China’s emissions have grown enormously over the past few years, more than 
doubling between 2003 and 2011, in part because of rapid domestic economic growth and 
also because the developed world has outsourced significant manufacturing to China.145  
Without policy changes, China's emissions would continue to rise through 2050, more than 
doubling again from current levels.146   
In recent years, the country has developed a substantial policy framework 
addressing GHG emissions.  The country’s 12th Five Year Plan set 2015 targets not only for 
energy and carbon intensity, but also for use of non-fossil fuels and increased 
afforestation.147  The 12th Five Year Plan also committed China to developing a carbon 
market, with pilot cap-and-trade programs to be established in seven Chinese provinces 
and cities.  All seven jurisdictions, including Bejing and Shanghai, have now begun their 
carbon markets.148  Additionally, since the beginning of 2013, China has promulgated a 
wide range of policies on air pollution that in many cases produce climate change co-
benefits.   
In November 2014, President Obama and Chinese President Xi made a historic 
announcement.  The U.S. would reduce its emissions by 26-28 percent below 2005 levels by 
2025, while China would achieve peak CO2 emissions and increase the share of zero-
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emission energy to 20 percent by 2030. 149   These commitments were subsequently 
embodied in the INDCs of both countries.  Chinese President Xi made significant 
additional commitments at a meeting with President Obama in September 2015.  Among 
other steps, President Xi announced that China would start a national emissions trading 
system by 2017.150 
Some critics of China’s efforts have claimed that China’s commitments are not 
comparable to the U.S. commitments because they allow Chinese emissions to continue to 
grow until 2030.151  Others have taken the opposite position and argued that China’s 
commitments are so ambitious they may never be achieved.152 
In fact, there are multiple metrics by which China’s commitments look at least as 
ambitious, if not more so, than the U.S.’s.  According to the White House, China’s zero-
emission energy commitment “will require China to deploy an additional 800-1,000 
gigawatts of nuclear, wind, solar and other zero emission generation capacity by 2030 – 
more than all the coal-fired power plants that exist in China today and close to the total 
current electricity generation capacity in the United States.”153  China recent announcement 
that it will adopt a nationwide cap-and-trade program for GHG emissions is a more 
comprehensive regulatory approach than any in the United States.  Carbon Action Tracker 
has developed a methodology for comparing the level of effort reflected in countries’ 
INDCs, taking into account “the full range of estimates from the literature” used in the 
effort-sharing studies identified by the IPCC, supplemented by additional analyses it 
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performs to complete the dataset.154  Carbon Action Tracker gives both the U.S. pledge and 
the Chinese pledge a “medium” rating.155   
These comparisons should give EPA a more than adequate basis to determine that 
China is making at least reciprocal substantive efforts to curb climate change. 
2. The EU 
The case for substantive reciprocity with the EU is also strong, if not stronger.  EU 
countries have been considerably more active on climate change than most other nations.  
The EU is currently on track to achieve its goals for 2020, which will reduce emissions by 
20 percent compared to 1990 levels, increase use of renewable energy, and improve energy 
efficiency.156  Among the strategies for achieving the emissions reduction goals is Europe’s 
Emissions Trading System, a broad cap-and-trade program covering more than 11,000 
power stations and industrial plants, as well as airline flights within the EU.157     
The EU’s INDC addresses the actions it will take post-2020.  It includes a pledge to 
reduce its domestic emissions by at least 40 percent below 1990 levels by 2030.158  EU 
leaders have also announced a more ambitious greenhouse gas emission reduction target 
of 80-90 percent below 1990 levels by 2050.159   
These commitments are at least comparable with the U.S.’s INDC.  The U.S. pledge 
is to reduce domestic emissions by 26-28 percent below 2005 levels by 2025.  Measured 
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from a 1990 baseline, this is equivalent to a 14-17 percent reduction below U.S. 1990 
levels.160  By this metric, the EU will have exceeded U.S. reductions years ahead of the U.S.  
Using its more comprehensive methodology, Carbon Action Tracker gives both the U.S. 
and the EU the same “medium” rating.161  As in the case of China, these comparisons 
would support an EPA finding of substantive reciprocity.   
3.3.5 Enforceability of Reciprocal Commitments 
It is possible that opponents to EPA action under Section 115 would challenge a 
reciprocity determination by arguing that foreign countries may not follow through in 
implementing their GHG reduction commitments.  There is, however, no requirement in 
Section 115 that the emission reduction pledges of foreign nations be legally enforceable 
by the U.S.   In fact, if the foreign pledges were enforceable by the U.S., the foreign nations 
would be providing greater legal rights to U.S. than the U.S. is likely to provide to them.  
While it may be unlikely as a practical matter, there is no legal barrier preventing a future 
President from directing EPA to revoke the final rules President Obama has issued to 
reduce GHG emissions, such as the final rules promulgated under Section 202 of the Clean 
Air Act for motor vehicles or under Section 111 for new and existing power plants, or any 
rules promulgated in the future pursuant to Section 115. 162   Moreover, it appears 
questionable that a foreign government could avail itself of litigation to enforce the EPA 
rules.163   
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In any event, EPA could probably address this challenge by reserving the 
opportunity to withdraw its reciprocity determination at a later date.  Such a right to 
withdraw its determination inheres in EPA’s authority under the statute.  Indeed, 
Administrator Costle endorsed just such a procedure in the letters in which he made his 
acid rain reciprocity and endangerment findings.  There, he noted that although Canada’s 
law appeared facially to provide “essentially the same rights,” his finding was only the 
first step of a two-step determination: 
It is not possible to make a permanently binding determination that Canada 
has given the United States essentially the same rights based simply on a 
review of Canadian authorizing legislation.  EPA first determines that 
Canadian legislation gives ample authority to the Government of Canada to 
provide essentially the same rights to the United States.  Second, EPA must 
determine that the Government of Canada is exercising or interpreting that 
authority in a manner that provides essentially the same rights to the United 
States.  This second aspect of EPA's determination is necessarily a dynamic 
one which will continue to be influenced by Canadian action now and in the 
future.164  
 
3.4 The Applicability of Sections 110 and Section 115 to GHGs 
Assuming EPA can make both an endangerment finding and a reciprocity 
determination, there is one final threshold question that may arise:  Can Section 115 be 
applied to GHG emissions?  In February 2008, the EPA Director of Atmospheric Programs 
rejected a request submitted by a Canadian environmental group to regulate or reduce 
GHG emissions under Section 115 on the grounds that the Section 110 SIP process 
triggered by Section 115 could be used only to achieve National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards (NAAQS) for “criteria” pollutants listed under Section 108. 165  EPA took a 
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Kochl, Staff Attorney, Ecojustice Canada (Feb. 29, 2008).  See also U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Regulating 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354, 44,482–83 (Jul. 30, 2008).  To date, EPA has 
listed only six common air pollutants as criteria pollutants:  ozone, particulate matter, carbon monoxide, nitrogen 
oxides, sulfur dioxide, and lead.  Environment Protection Agency, What Are the Six Common Air Pollutants?, available 
online at http://www3.epa.gov/airquality/urbanair/. 
Legal Pathways to Reducing GHG Emissions under Section 115 of the Clean Air Act 
 
Sabin Center| Emmett Institute | Policy Integrity 44 
 
similar position in its July 2008 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Regulating 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions under the Clean Air Act, where it wrote that “Section 115 
could not be used to require states to incorporate into their SIPs measures unrelated to 
attainment or maintenance of a NAAQS.” 166   These precedents make it likely that 
opponents of EPA action under Section 115 would raise a similar objection.167 
However, this interpretation of the limited scope of Section 110, and by extension 
Section 115, has been superseded by subsequent ones and most likely foreclosed 
altogether.  Indeed, EPA has since used the SIP process to address GHGs, and the 
Supreme Court has upheld the agency’s action.   
In 2010, EPA called on states to revise their SIPs to incorporate GHG emission 
reductions through the Prevention of Significant Deterioration program. 168   The PSD 
program is designed to protect air quality in areas that meet one or more NAAQS, and is 
implemented through SIPs.  In particular, EPA required states to revise their SIPs to 
require new large sources of GHGs to obtain PSD permits, which would require the 
sources to employ “best available control technology” (“BACT”) for GHGs. 169  In this 
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rulemaking, EPA expressly rejected comments arguing that the agency could not use SIPs 
to address GHG emissions.170 
In Connecticut v. American Electric Power and Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA the 
Supreme Court confirmed EPA’s authority to require states to regulate GHGs from some 
large stationary sources through their SIPs.171  In the latter case, the Court specifically 
upheld EPA’s requirement that states revise their SIPs to require new large sources to 
control GHG emissions, though the Court limited the requirement to sources that would 
already need a permit because of emissions of other pollutants. 172   States are now 
implementing the requirements of the PSD program for GHG emissions through the SIP 
revision process.173  Regulating GHGs through Section 115, then, is in full conformance 
with Supreme Court precedent. 
In addition to this recent Supreme Court precedent, the plain language of Section 
115 makes clear that the provision extends to GHGs, even though no NAAQS have been 
issued for them.174  Section 115(a) states that the section applies to “any air pollutant.”175  
The statute defines “air pollutant” as including “any physical, chemical … substance or 
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matter” which enters the ambient air.176 In Massachusetts v. EPA the Supreme Court held 
that this phrase “embraces all airborne compounds of any stripe,” including greenhouse 
gases “without a doubt.” 177   The Court considered the argument that regulating 
greenhouse gas emissions under section 202 of the Clean Air Act would lead to “extreme 
measures” and rejected the contention, stating that “there is nothing counterintuitive to 
the notion that EPA can curtail the emission of substances that are putting the global 
climate out of kilter.”178  The Court qualified its interpretation of “any air pollutant” in its 
2014 decision in Utility Air Regulatory Group, holding that the words “any air pollutant” 
must “be read in their context and with a view to their overall statutory scheme.”179  The 
Court there invalidated EPA’s interpretation, which would have extended EPA’s PSD 
permitting authority over tens of thousands of previously uncovered smaller sources.  This 
latter decision thus supports the application of Section 115 to GHGs in principle, as both 
the context and statutory scheme call for applying Section 115 to GHGs – in short, there is 
no more compelling example of emissions that affect other nations than greenhouse gases.  
The two instances are also factually distinguishable, as interpreting section 115 to cover 
GHGs would not expand substantially the number of sources subject to regulation under 
the Clean Air Act.  Rather, it can provide a more flexible and market-based approach for 
regulating sources of GHGs.       
The carefully crafted cross-references in Section 115 and Section 110 offer further 
support for the interpretation that Section 115 can apply to GHGs.  Section 115(b) provides 
that an endangerment finding under subsection (a) “shall be deemed a finding under 
section 7410(a)(2)(H)(ii) … which requires a [SIP] revision with respect to so much of the 
applicable implementation plan as is inadequate to prevent or eliminate the 
endangerment.”180  Section 110(a)(2)(H)(ii) in turn requires states to revise their SIPs under 
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two conditions:  (1) “whenever the Administrator finds … that the plan is substantially 
inadequate to attain the national ambient air quality standard” or (2) “whenever the 
Administrator finds … that the plan is substantially inadequate … to otherwise comply 
with any additional requirements established under this Act.”181  The “comply with any 
additional requirements” language in section 110(a)(2)(H)(ii) can easily encompass 
requirements involving GHGs.  In addition, Section 110(a)(2)(D) requires that SIPs contain 
adequate provisions for both attaining the relevant NAAQS and “insuring compliance 
with the applicable requirements of section[] … 115 of this title (relating to … international 
pollution abatement).”182  Thus, the statute clearly authorizes the use of SIPs to control 
“any pollutant” designated for international pollution control under Section 115, including 
non-NAAQS pollutants.183   
Even if a court determined that the statute was ambiguous on this point, it would 
be patently reasonable for EPA to read Section 110 as applying to greenhouse gases in the 
context of a Section 115 determination. Section 115 seeks to address “international air 
pollution” from “any” air pollutant, and it contains no limiting language which would 
suggest that greenhouse gases or climate change somehow fall beyond the scope of this 
imperative.  Moreover, because Section 115 concerns public health and welfare impacts 
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abroad, where domestic NAAQS necessarily will not apply, there is no reason to assume 
that NAAQS are relevant.  The relationship between Section 115 and 110 appears designed 
to take advantage of the SIP process, and the flexibility it gives states to adopt a wide 
range of pollution reduction approaches, not to limit international air pollution abatement 
to the six criteria pollutants EPA has, to date, identified.  
The legislative history of Section 115 further demonstrates that this reading accords 
with congressional intent.  As discussed above, an international air pollution provision 
was first added to the Clean Air Act in 1965.184  According to the Senate report, the 
purpose of this new provision was to enable the United States to “authorize cooperative 
action with foreign countries when air pollution is endangering the health or welfare or 
their people” and “in the interest of international amity and in fairness to the people of 
other countries, afford them the benefit of protective measures.”185  There is nothing in the 
language of the legislative history that refers to NAAQS, as NAAQS did not exist at that 
time. 
In 1970, Congress moved the international air pollution provision to section 115 of 
the Clean Air Act,186 and in 1977, Congress endeavored to streamline and make more 
effective the process for achieving reductions in U.S. emissions affecting other nations by 
replacing the previous domestic and international conference procedures with new EPA 
authority to require states to revise their state implementation plans to abate international 
air pollution.187  There is no indication in the legislative history of either the 1970 or 1977 
laws that these changes were intended to limit the provision to addressing air pollution 
associated with domestically determined NAAQS.188   
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4. POTENTIAL LEGAL ISSUES FOR SECTION 115 IMPLEMENTATION  
In Her Majesty the Queen, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that Section 115 
“creates a specific linkage between the endangerment finding and the remedial 
procedures,” such that EPA’s interpretation that it required information sufficient to track 
emissions to specific sources prior to making an endangerment finding was reasonable, 
and its decision not to initiate rulemaking without such information was not arbitrary and 
capricious.189  Though the case pertained to the narrow question of tracing emissions to 
sources, it supports a broader conclusion as well: EPA may postpone issuing an 
endangerment finding and reciprocity determination while it investigates ways of 
implementing a remedy.  In the case of climate change that means EPA should have a plan 
in mind, and the substance of the SIP call ready, when it issues its findings.190 
This section addresses six implementation issues that EPA may want to consider 
under Section 115: (1) how EPA could set an aggregate limit for national GHG emissions 
reductions under Section 115; (2) how EPA could allocate a national emissions limit among 
the states; (3) how EPA could establish federal implementation plans (FIPs) for states that 
fail to modify their state implementation plans (SIPs) to comply with the requirements of 
Section 115; (4) how EPA and the states could integrate a Section 115 GHG emissions 
reduction regime with existing GHG emissions reduction programs under Section 111; (5) 
how EPA and the states could address emissions from transportation fuels and 
commercial and consumer use of natural gas under Section 115; and (6) how EPA and the 
states could permit the use of offsets in a prospective cap-and-trade program under 
Section 115.  
4.1 The Aggregate Limit for National Emissions  
Section 115(b) provides that if EPA invokes Section 115, EPA must require each 
state to revise “so much of the applicable implementation plan as is inadequate to prevent 
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or eliminate the endangerment” identified by the agency pursuant to Section 115(a).  Yet 
climate change is not a typical upwind-downwind air pollution problem.  Rather, GHGs 
are global pollutants that fully mix in the atmosphere and impact the planet’s climate.  
Accordingly, emissions from all U.S. states contribute to foreign endangerment, and 
reductions from any state would contribute equally to solving the problem.  To put it a 
different way, a ton of carbon pollution eliminated in Washington has the same effect as a 
ton of carbon pollution eliminated in Florida.  Therefore, independent state determinations 
of the GHG reductions necessary to “prevent or eliminate the endangerment” under 
Section 115 would prove unhelpful.  Successful implementation would instead require 
EPA to establish an aggregate amount of necessary U.S. emissions reductions.    
As a matter of both law and policy, it would be eminently reasonable for EPA to 
establish a national GHG emissions target under Section 115 based on the U.S.’s 
contribution to a global effort to reduce GHG emissions, such as the U.S. Intended 
Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) submitted to the UNFCCC in March 2015.191  
EPA’s position would be that U.S. action under Section 115 that is part of a coordinated 
global effort to combat climate change is adequate to “prevent or eliminate” the U.S. 
contribution to global climate change, as required by Section 115(b).  
In interpreting statutory meaning, “we begin with the language of the statute.”192  
Here the provision has two terms, prevent and eliminate, separated by the coordinating 
conjunction or.  Looking first at the word “eliminate,” it would appear impossible for SIP 
revisions under Section 115 to “eliminate” the endangerment caused by U.S. GHG 
emissions.  Due to existing atmospheric concentrations of long‐lived greenhouse gases, 
including the substantial percentage of those gases emitted within the United States, along 
with the continuing emissions by other countries, even if every state immediately reduced 
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its emissions to zero, foreign countries would continue to suffer the increased risks and 
adverse consequences of climate change, as in fact would the United States.  
However, it is possible for SIP revisions under Section 115 to “prevent” 
endangerment that U.S. emissions cause to foreign countries.  To “prevent” endangerment 
under Section 115 does not require removing all risk.  For example, seat belts are not 100 
percent effective at eliminating motor vehicle fatalities, yet they are widely regarded as an 
effective form of “preventing” such fatalities.  Among drivers and front-seat passengers, 
seat belts reduce the risk of death by 45 percent, and cut the risk of serious injury by 50 
percent.  Few would argue that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and its 
National Center for Injury Prevention and Control could not fund programs to promote 
seat belt use under a grant program enacted to “prevent or eliminate” motor vehicle 
fatalities.  As long as EPA is setting aggregate emission limits that will over time—and in 
conjunction with reciprocal actions by other nations—significantly reduce the risks of 
climate change, EPA can reasonably claim it has acted to prevent endangerment from 
climate change. 
This understanding of “prevent” finds support in leading definitions.  The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines “prevent” to mean “to anticipate or act in advance.”193  Black’s 
Law Dictionary defines “prevent” to mean “to hinder or impede.”194  Action by EPA that is 
consistent with a global framework for avoiding the worst impacts of climate change 
would be action that “anticipates” and “hinders or impedes”—and hence “prevents”—
dangerous climate change.  
Statutory context counsels in favor of an interpretation of Section 115 that requires 
pollution control rather than the cessation of all GHG emissions.195  Section 115(c) states 
that in order to establish reciprocity foreign countries must grant similar rights “with 
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respect to the prevention or control of air pollution.”196  Thus, the substantive rights the 
U.S. confers, and which it must receive in return, pertain not to elimination of pollution 
but to its “prevention or control.”  Looking to other provisions of the Clean Air Act, courts 
have long recognized EPA’s discretion to determine “how much of the regulated harm is 
too much,”197 and have acknowledged that protecting the public does not require “a world 
that is free of all risk—an impossible and undesirable objective.”198 Rather, EPA can and 
should consider context when “deciding what risks are acceptable in the world in which 
we live.”199   
The legislative history further supports an interpretation that grants EPA discretion 
in setting an appropriate aggregate limit for domestic GHG emissions.  Congress added 
the “prevent or eliminate” language when it revised Section 115 in the 1977 Clean Air Act 
Amendments. According to the Senate report, “Section 115 as revised . . . will require the 
State in which the source of those emissions is located to revise its implementation plan to 
control those emissions.”200  The stated purpose is to control emissions, not to eliminate 
them altogether. 
This understanding of prevention is consistent with the general concept of pollution 
prevention, as inscribed throughout environmental law.201  Perhaps most tellingly, the 
Pollution Prevention Act of 1990 does not require the elimination of any particular forms 
of pollution or of any pollution sources.  Instead, the Pollution Prevention Act equates 
prevention with “source reduction.”202  Source reduction is defined in the statute as “any 
practice which… (1) reduces the amount of any hazardous substance, pollutant, or 
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contaminant entering any waste stream or otherwise released into the environment…and 
(2) reduces the hazards to public health and the environment associated with the release of 
such substances, pollutants, or contaminants.”203  Notably, source reduction includes a 
broad range of approaches, including “equipment or technology modifications, process or 
procedure modifications, reformulation or redesign of products, substitution of raw 
materials, and improvements in housekeeping, maintenance, training, or inventory 
control.”204  In essence, the Pollution Prevention Act treats prevention as synonymous 
with, among other things, air pollutant emissions reductions.205  
It is clear that the international community needs to set itself on a course toward a 
zero carbon economy. 206   However, there is no recognizable pathway to immediate 
decarbonization, either domestically or worldwide.  Based on the language of Section 115, 
its place in the context of the Clean Air Act, its legislative history, and the common 
understanding of “pollution prevention” as reflected in U.S. environmental law EPA 
should have ample discretion to establish aggregate national targets for GHG emissions 
reductions that substantially reduce the U.S. contribution to climate change, especially if 
the aggregate limit is tied to the international commitments the U.S. has made in the 
context of the UNFCCC negotiations.207  The question that follows is how to allocate the 
targeted reductions to the states.   
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 Pollution Prevention Act of 1990 § 6603(5)(A).  
204
 Id.  
205
 See also Memorandum from F. Henry Habicht II to all EPA personnel, EPA Definition of “Pollution Prevention” 
(May 28, 1992), http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-07/documents/pollprev.pdf (noting that “the concept 
of pollution prevention is broadly applicable—a tool to accomplish many environmental task;” that “[p]ollution 
prevention requires a cultural change—one which encourages more anticipation and internalizing of real environmental 
costs by those who may generate pollution”; and that in the energy sector, pollution prevention strategies include 
“increasing efficiency in energy use; substituting environmentally benign fuel sources; and design changes that reduce 
the demand for energy”).  
206
 See DEEP DECARBONIZATION PATHWAYS PROJECT , PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION 2015 REPORT (2015). 
207
 Other reasonable approaches exist.  See INSTITUTE FOR POLICY INTEGRITY AT NYU SCHOOL OF LAW, PETITION FOR 
RULEMAKING AND CALL FOR INFORMATION UNDER SECTION 115, TITLE VII, SECTION 111, AND TITLE II OF THE CLEAN 
AIR ACT TO REGULATE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 15 (2013) (proposing that EPA might set the standard “at the 
point where the marginal abatement costs, based on reasonable technology projections, equal the global social cost of 
carbon”). 
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4.2 Allocation to States 
Once EPA has set an aggregate level of emissions reductions, Section 115 would 
then require the agency to inform affected state governors (which in the case of GHGs is 
all state governors) of the need to revise their SIPs to “prevent or eliminate” their portion 
of emissions that are creating endangerment.208  To implement this second step, EPA 
would need to apportion responsibility for necessary emissions reductions among states.  
Section 115 does not dictate a methodology for apportionment, leaving EPA with the 
power to consider costs, or to decline to consider costs, and to consider any number of 
other factors in making allocation decisions.   
To do so, EPA might utilize a variety of formulas.  For example, EPA might require 
each state to meet an equal percentage reduction, as measured from a selected baseline 
year (the “equal percentage” approach).  Alternatively, it might require each state to 
reduce its emissions to a point where marginal cost reductions are equal across states, 
thereby achieving the same target but assigning responsibility based on implementation 
costs rather than equal percentage reductions (the “equal marginal cost” approach).  Each 
of these methodologies would produce relative winners and losers among the states.  To 
temper these disparate impacts, EPA might choose a third methodology that combines 
these two methods, assigning a portion of required reductions as a percentage of state 
emissions but another portion on the basis of cost (the “combined” approach).  If EPA 
were to select a methodology that resulted in different costs among states, it could permit 
states to adopt cross-state trading in order to lower implementation costs, as it would 
under the backstop FIP discussed in Section C, below. 
EPA might also adopt an approach similar to that taken in the Clean Power Plan.  
There, EPA examined the source category to be regulated—existing power plants—and 
established state targets based on the agency’s state-by-state determination of the “best 
                                                     
208
 Id. at §§ 7415(a), (b). 
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system of emissions reduction” achievable through select policy and technology choices.209  
For existing power plants, these include measures that can be applied at individual coal 
plants, such as efficiency improvements; measures that allow plant owners credit for fuel-
switching, or shifting the mix of electricity generation away from existing coal plants 
toward existing gas plants; and measures that allow plant owners credit for electricity 
generation from zero-carbon and renewable sources such as nuclear facilities, wind 
turbines, and solar plants.  The mix would be different under Section 115, as it would 
involve more source categories than the Clean Power Plan, but EPA could likely embark 
on a similar analysis.  The outcome should be even less susceptible to legal challenge than 
the allocation of emission reduction obligations under the Clean Power Plan, as Section 
115 standards are not constrained by the “best system of emissions reduction” standard.    
The Supreme Court’s April 2014 decision in EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, 
L.P.210 adds significant weight to a line of cases affording EPA substantial deference in 
determining how to allocate responsibility for meeting air quality obligations among 
states.  This case involved the Clean Air Act’s “good neighbor” provision, which prohibits 
states from “emitting any air pollutant in amounts which will . . . contribute significantly” 
to unacceptable levels of air pollution in downwind states.211  Like Section 115, the good 
neighbor provision requires EPA to apportion emission reductions among states, and EPA 
has long struggled with how to apportion responsibility for these emissions reductions 
among upwind states.212 
EME Homer provided important clarity (and a victory) for EPA.  The Supreme 
Court considered the validity of EPA’s “Transport Rule,” 213  which apportioned good 
neighbor responsibility for sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxide (NOX) emissions among 
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 See generally Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating 
Units; Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 64661 (2015).  
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 EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014). 
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 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i). 
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 See EME Homer, 134 S. Ct. at 1593.  
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 Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone and Correction of SIP 
Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,207 (Aug 8, 2011). 
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upwind states based on the availability of cost effective pollution reduction options within 
the state—in other words, based on an equal marginal cost methodology.  In its opinion 
below, the D.C. Circuit had read the “contribute significantly” limitation of the good 
neighbor provision to require apportionment based on physical pollutant contributions 
alone, rather than cost, and therefore invalidated EPA’s methodology.214  The Supreme 
Court disagreed.  First, it found no language in the good neighbor provision that dictated 
a particular allocation methodology.  Then, invoking Chevron deference,215 it found EPA’s 
selected methodology a reasonable response to the “thorny causation problem” of how 
EPA should “allocate among multiple contributing upwind States responsibility for a 
downwind State’s excess pollution.”216  The court went on to praise EPA’s use of cost 
criteria as an “efficient and equitable solution to the allocation problem.”217 
EME Homer should give EPA confidence that it can approach the question of GHG 
allocation under Section 115 in a similarly flexible manner.  Indeed Section 115 contains no 
limiting language about allocation, whereas the good neighbor provision requires states to 
reduce emissions that cross state borders only if the emissions “contribute significantly” to 
downstate pollution.  Any of the three allocation methodologies mentioned here—equal 
percentage reductions, equal marginal costs, or a combined methodology—should be 
defensible as a reasonable choice.   
If EPA chose to use an equal marginal cost allocation methodology, EME Homer 
would be directly on point, since the Court endorsed a cost-based methodology under a 
similarly ambiguous section of the Act.218  But EME Homer also provides leeway to EPA to 
require equal percentage GHG reductions.  The EME Homer majority rejected a 
requirement of proportional reductions in the good neighbor context on the grounds of 
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 EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. U.S. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 25–26 (D.C. Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014).  
215
 Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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 EME Homer, 134 S. Ct. at 1604. 
217
 Id. at 1607. 
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 As described in EME Homer, before employing a cost-based methodology to allocate Good Neighbor responsibility, 
EPA first screened out those states whose contributions to downwind pollution it found to be de minimis, deeming them 
not to be significant contributors.  See id. at 1596.  However, it is unlikely that any states would have de minimis GHG 
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unworkability,219 but it nowhere suggested that this methodology would be unreasonable 
in contexts where it would prove workable.  In the case of Section 115 GHG reductions, 
proportionality would prove easy to implement, as a ton emitted in any state equally 
affects all foreign countries’ endangerment.  Moreover, because both the D.C. Circuit and 
the EME Homer dissent read the good neighbor provision not only to permit 
proportionality but to require it,220 this approach should survive judicial scrutiny.221   
States that have made relatively greater historical investments in cleaner energy 
might use EME Homer to object to an equal percentage reduction methodology under 
Section 115 as inequitably (and therefore unreasonably) penalizing these states “for having 
done more to reduce pollution in the past.”222  Likewise, states that have more polluting 
sources of energy that are less expensive to control might argue that an equal marginal 
cost allocation would force them to make disproportionately large reductions.  A 
combined approach, such as one that allocated a portion of the emission reductions on cost 
and a portion on emissions, would balance these competing equities.  There is no language 
in Section 115 that would suggest that EPA could not seek to balance states’ competing 
equities in this manner.   
In sum, under the deference accorded to EPA to fill gaps in the face of statutory 
silence, it would likely be permissible for EPA to allocate Section 115 GHG reduction 
obligations to states by requiring equal percentage reductions, equal marginal cost 
reductions, or some combination of these two methodologies, including an approach 
similar to that utilized in the Clean Power Plan.  
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 Id. at 1594, 1604–05 (explaining the impossibility of devising a proportional reduction scheme for NOX and SO2 
given the “thousands” of “overlapping and interwoven linkages between upwind and downwind States”). 
220
 Id. at 1611 (Scalia, J., dissenting); 696 F.3d 7, 24–25 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
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 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Michigan v. EPA does not dictate that EPA must consider costs in allocating 
GHG emissions reductions to the states under Section 115.  In that case the Court held that EPA’s determination that 
regulation under Section 112 is “appropriate” required the agency to consider costs. Here, nothing in the language or 
structure of the statute so limits EPA’s discretion.  Indeed, the only relevant limiting criteria here is that the states’ SIPs 
be revised to “prevent” endangerment. 
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 134 S. Ct. at 1607. 
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4.3 Federal Implementation Plans 
In implementing Section 115, EPA may also need to promulgate federal 
implementation plans (FIPs) for some states.  Under the Clean Air Act, states have the 
primary responsibility for addressing air pollution. 223   Section 110 of the Act, the 
mechanism for responding to pollution identified under Section 115, requires each state to 
submit to EPA a SIP to comply with certain requirements of the Clean Air Act, including 
Section 115. 224   If, however, a state does not submit a SIP, or submits a SIP that is 
inadequate to meet Clean Air Act requirements, EPA must promulgate a FIP for that state.   
Under Section 115, once EPA has made requisite findings for endangerment and 
reciprocity, it must give notice to states whose emissions cause or contribute to 
international endangerment. 225   This notice is deemed a finding under Section 
110(a)(2)(H)(ii) that the state’s SIP is “substantially inadequate” to comply with Clean Air 
Act requirements.226  This finding triggers Section 110(k)(5), which provides that whenever 
EPA finds a SIP “substantially inadequate,” it must call on the state to revise its SIP.227  
This process is commonly known as a “SIP call.”  Upon issuing a SIP call, EPA may set 
“reasonable deadlines” for states to submit SIP revisions, not to exceed 18 months.228  If at 
the expiration of a revision deadline, a state has failed to submit a SIP revision, or if a state 
submits a revision that EPA finds inadequate, Section 110 requires EPA to promulgate a 
FIP within two years, unless the state first corrects the deficiency sufficiently to receive 
EPA’s approval.229   
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 See 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) (“air pollution prevention . . . is the primary responsibility of States and local 
governments”). 
224
 Id. at § 7410(a)(2)(H)(ii) (requiring SIPs to “contain adequate provisions” to ensure compliance with Section 115). 
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States have strong incentives under the Clean Air Act to submit SIPs. 230   By 
developing a SIP, a state retains control over its emissions and the compliance mechanisms 
that it uses to control these emissions.  The Clean Air Act allows states to meet their air 
pollution obligations through a wide range of compliance options, including “economic 
incentives such as fees, marketable permits, and auctions of emissions rights.” 231   If, 
however, a state fails to submit an adequate SIP, it surrenders control to EPA to design a 
FIP, which is then binding upon the state. 
In order to encourage states to submit SIPs, to reduce the administrative burden on 
states, or to encourage uniformity sought by industry, EPA may issue guidance or model 
rules for how states can achieve compliance.  For example, when EPA issued a SIP call for 
states to address NOX emissions contributing to interstate ozone pollution (the “NOX SIP 
Call”), EPA allowed states to elect to join a program established by EPA by adopting a 
“model rule” promulgated by the agency.232  States could choose to incorporate this model 
rule by reference, or could adopt the rule separately, provided a state did not make 
significant changes to EPA’s rule.233  If the state’s rules closely followed those of EPA’s 
model, states were eligible for a streamlined SIP approval process.234  EPA has adopted a 
similar approach in the Clean Power Plan.235  It could likewise use a model rule to help 
states design SIPs that comply with the requirements of Section 115, as well as to promote 
consistency among states. 
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 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A).  The choice of SIP compliance mechanism belongs wholly to states; in determining state 
obligations, EPA may not require a state to adopt any particular compliance method.  See Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 
1397, 1410 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“Section 110 does not enable EPA to force particular control measures on the states.”). 
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 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,456 (Oct. 27, 1998).  
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 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,458 (Oct. 27, 1998).  
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 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,458.  All affected states adopted the rule within EPA’s flexibility guidelines.  See NATHAN 
RICHARDSON, ART FRAAS, AND DALLAS BURTRAW, GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATION UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT: 
STRUCTURE, EFFECTS, AND IMPLICATIONS OF A KNOWABLE PATHWAY 12 (2010), http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-
DP-10-23.pdf. 
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Nevertheless, it is possible that some states might remain non-compliant either by 
refusing to submit a SIP or by submitting an obviously inadequate one.236  In such a case, 
EPA would be required to promulgate a FIP to address GHG pollution.  EPA could take 
several different approaches, which could be more or less resource intensive.  A 
streamlined approach that utilizes market-based mechanisms, minimizes administrative 
burdens on EPA, and maximizes the likelihood of state participation could have four core 
components: 
(1) a federal requirement that all covered sources in the state turn in allowances 
for each ton of GHG emitted each year; 
(2) a federal distribution of allowances to each state, equal to the state’s 
emissions budget as determined by EPA; 
(3) an opportunity for the state to allocate the allowances to sources in whatever 
manner the state deems most appropriate, supported by a backstop of a 
federal auction of the allowances if a state is unwilling to do so; and 
(4) a system for sources to trade allowances. 
This streamlined FIP would have several advantages.  By employing a cap-and-
trade mechanism, the FIP would increase flexibility and reduce compliance costs for 
industry.  It would also incentivize state participation by giving a state the opportunity to 
determine how to allocate the allowances even where it does not submit a plan.237  If a state 
chose not allocate the allowances, EPA would auction them under the FIP, with the 
proceeds going to the federal treasury.  This would be an option that the states – and the 
sources in the state – would in all likelihood find unappealing.  In addition, as discussed 
below, EPA could rely substantially on its prior efforts to address interstate ozone 
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 See, e.g., Texas v. EPA, 726 F.3d 180, 186 (D.C. Cir. 2013).  Here, the court quotes a letter sent by Texas authorities 
to EPA, in response to EPA’s call for the state to address GHGs within its PSD program requirements, which declared 
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 There are multiple policies that can be effectuated through allowance allocation:  Allowances can be given away 
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to finance investments in clean energy or efficiency, or to offset costs that might be borne by consumers.  The decision 
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pollution, which used cap-and-trade approaches that have already been shown to be both 
practicable and legally sound. 
There would appear to be little question about EPA’s authority to pursue this 
streamlined approach.  The Clean Air Act specifically authorizes states or EPA to use 
market mechanisms within Section 110 implementation plans.  Section 110(a)(2)(A) 
requires SIPs to include “enforceable emission limitations and other control measures, 
means or techniques,” which may include “economic incentives such as fees, marketable 
permits, and auctions of emissions rights.” 238   Section 302(y) defines “Federal 
implementation plan” by echoing this language, allowing EPA to use “economic 
incentives, such as marketable permits or auctions of emissions allowances” to correct an 
inadequate SIP.239  EPA also has general authority under Section 301(a) to “to prescribe 
such regulations as are necessary to carry out [its] functions” under the Clean Air Act.240 
EPA has previously used market-based approaches under Section 110 to address 
interstate pollution that could be models for a Section 115 FIP.  In its 1998 NOX SIP Call 
introduced a cap-and-trade program for NOX pollution, known as the NOX Budget 
Trading Program.241  The 2011 Transport Rule, a more stringent successor to the NOx 
Budget Trading Program, likewise implemented similar trading programs for both NOX 
and SO2.242  In issuing these rules, EPA specifically invoked its authority under Section 110 
and 302(y), as well as its general authority under Section 301(a).243 
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240
 42 U.S.C. § 7601(a)(1); see also Citizens to Save Spencer County v. EPA, 600 F.2d 844, 873 (D.C. Cir. 1979) 
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 See 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,456 (Oct. 21, 1998).  
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1998); 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,217 (Aug. 8, 2011).  
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The NOX Budget Trading Program, in particular, offers a good model.  Under the 
NOx Budget Trading Program, which ran from 2003 to 2008 through EPA’s Clean Air 
Markets Division, EPA determined emission budgets for each state.  EPA issued 
allowances to each state according to its emission budget, giving states the opportunity to 
allocate these allowances to sources within their borders according to a wide range of 
criteria, including by auction.  Once states allocated the allowances, sources could buy and 
sell the allowances through a trading market.244  States were allowed to join the program 
voluntarily by SIP, but any state that failed to submit an adequate SIP became subject to 
the program by FIP. 245   The program was generally successful in reducing ozone 
pollution, 246  and the Transport Rule built on its model for allowance allocations and 
trading.247  The primary difference in the Transport Rule and the NOX Budget Trading 
Program is that EPA from the outset implemented the Transport Rule by FIP rather than 
SIP.248  Importantly, both of these programs have survived legal challenge.249  
Under the streamlined Section 115 FIP sketched here, EPA could follow the same 
procedures that it utilized in these programs to require sources to obtain allowances equal 
to their emissions and to oversee trading activities.  The streamlined FIP departs from this 
model slightly, in ways that may improve upon these earlier programs.  For example, by 
allowing states the opportunity to determine how allowances should be distributed in lieu 
of a federal auction, EPA may be able to involve even the most reluctant states in the 
administration of Section 115 requirements.   
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 This description of the NOX Budget Trading Program is drawn from an overview of the program prepared by EPA. 
See EPA, I. NOX BUDGET TRADING PROGRAM – BASIC INFORMATION 6-8 (2009), 
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4.4 Integration of Section 115 with Section 111 
Any action EPA undertakes pursuant to Section 115 will take place while EPA also 
implements other critical GHG emissions regulations, including the New Source 
Performance Standards established under Section 111 for new power plants, the Clean 
Power Plan established under Section 111 for existing power plants, and methane 
emissions reductions standards for the oil and gas sector and municipal landfills.  The 
question that arises is whether EPA and the states can integrate these existing rules with a 
more comprehensive GHG emissions regime established under Section 115.  The answer 
appears to be a straightforward “Yes.”  Indeed, integration of these statutory programs 
would be a fairly straightforward task for EPA and the states.  Moreover, using Section 115 
to coordinate future regulation and to integrate the existing NSPS for gas- and coal-fired 
power plants, the Clean Power Plan, and the methane emissions reduction initiatives is 
lawful and makes good policy sense, as all of these sections are mutually supportive, 
allowing for both greater regulatory coherence and greater flexibility for states and 
industry than a piecemeal, sector-by-sector approach.    
There are three key provisions of the Clean Air Act at play here: Section 111(b), 
Section 111(d) and Section 115.  Section 111(b) gives EPA the authority to establish new 
source performance standards (NSPS) for stationary sources of an air pollutant.250  Section 
111(d) gives EPA the authority to establish procedures by which states can establish plans 
for implementing and enforcing performance standards for existing sources of an certain 
air pollutants, once EPA has already established NSPS for that pollutant under 111(b).251  
In January 2014, EPA proposed new source performance standards for GHG emissions 
from new fossil fuel-fired power plants.252  In June 2014, EPA proposed performance 
standards for GHG emissions from existing power plants in its “Clean Power Plan 
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Legal Pathways to Reducing GHG Emissions under Section 115 of the Clean Air Act 
 
Sabin Center| Emmett Institute | Policy Integrity 64 
 
Rule.”253  In August 2015, EPA issued final versions of both the NSPS254 and the Clean 
Power Plan.255 In addition, in August 2015 EPA issued a proposal under Section 111(d) to 
reduce emissions of methane-rich gas from municipal solid waste landfills by nearly a 
third as compared with current levels.256  And in September 2015, EPA proposed to amend 
the NSPS for the oil and natural gas source category by setting standards for both methane 
and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) for certain equipment, processes and activities in 
the sector.257  
Assuming EPA established a national target for GHG emissions reductions under 
Section 115 and allocated state budgets along one of the lines discussed above, these 
various Section 111 standards could then be integrated with the Section 115 requirements 
through the SIP revision process.  As a practical matter, states and EPA regularly integrate 
existing clean air standards and programs, including Section 111 performance standards, 
into SIPs.258  This may be accomplished either by (a) quantifying the reductions produced 
by existing standards and programs and using that number to reduce the baseline 
emissions forecast of a pollutant, or (b) incorporating the existing standards and programs 
by reference and claiming credit for the reductions they produce.  The example below 
illustrates how this integrative process can work under the latter method: 
Imagine that State X is in noncompliance with the National Ambient Air Quality 
Standard for sulfur dioxide (SOx).  Imagine also that State X has to submit a SIP that 
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reduces SOx emissions by 1000 tons per year to meet the NAAQS for SOx.  Finally, 
imagine that a Section 111(d) plan for existing municipal solid waste landfills that 
seeks to reduce emissions of a non-criteria pollutant produces a co-benefit of SOx 
reductions amounting to 200 tons.  These 200 tons are surplus, required, 
enforceable, and quantifiable.  The state can claim credit for the 200 tons and apply 
it to the 1000 tons required in the SIP, meaning other sources will need to reduce 
their SOx emissions by only 800 tons.   
In the same way, EPA can allow states to claim credit for Section 111(b) and 111(d) 
plans for GHG emissions and apply those credits toward their Section 115 targets. 259  
What’s more, if the timelines permit EPA could allow states to submit a combined plan for 
the Clean Power Plan and Section 115, for instance, so as to conserve administrative 
resources, achieve greater efficiency, and promote regulatory coherence. 
As a matter of statutory interpretation, there is little question that the integration of 
Section 111 and Section 115 programs is permissible.  The plain meaning of the statutory 
language gives EPA authority to address domestic air pollution problems through Section 
111 and international air pollution problems through Section 115.260  These are mutually 
supportive provisions, and nothing in either provision suggests that overlapping air 
pollution problems must or even should be treated independently, or that Congress 
intended for an “either/or” choice as between them.  To the extent that the Clean Air Act 
could be said to be silent or ambiguous on this point, an EPA interpretation that seeks to 
harmonize regulatory programs addressing GHG emissions—thereby increasing efficiency 
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 Methodologies for incorporating existing programs into implementation plans are discussed at EPA, ROADMAP FOR 
INCORPORATING EE/RE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS INTO STATE AND TRIBAL IMPLEMENTATION PLANS (2012), 
http://www3.epa.gov/airquality/eere/pdfs/EEREmanual.pdf. See also NICHOLAS INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY SOLUTIONS, BEYOND CARBON DIOXIDE: CAPTURING AIR QUALITY BENEFITS WITH STATE SECTION 111(D) 
PLANS 10-16 (2014), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/wp_14-04.pdf (discussing ways to 
incorporate collateral criteria pollutant reductions from the Clean Power Plan into the NAAQS compliance regime).  
260
 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984) (in interpreting a statute, 
“[f]irst, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue”).  It bears noting 
that that while the trigger for exercising EPA’s authority under Section 111 is danger to domestic health and welfare, 
EPA may still consider the global benefits of action in calibrating its greenhouse gas standards under Section 111, and 
in particular may use the global Social Cost of Carbon metric to evaluate such standards. 
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for federal regulators, states and industry—would most likely be found to be a reasonable 
one.261   
On a technical level, integration can be accomplished relatively straightforwardly.  
EPA could declare in its Section 115 SIP call, as it has in the final Clean Power Plan Rule, 
that “existing state programs can be aligned with” the Section 115 plan so long as the state 
program satisfies certain criteria and contains requisite elements.262  Alternatively, EPA 
could use the SIP call to allow states to coordinate planning efforts and create a combined 
Section 111/115 plan.  The harmonization of different types of emissions measurements 
should also be workable.  The final Clean Power Plan Rule calls for a rate-based emissions 
standard but allows for states to convert that standard to a mass-based emissions 
standard.263  Given that existing GHG emissions trading regimes—including the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, the California Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade Program, and 
the European Union Emissions Trading System—all utilize mass-based emissions 
standards, a Section 115 regime would likely utilize a mass-based emissions standard.  
Presumably, a Section 115 SIP call could use a similar formula to that permitted in the final 
Clean Power Plan Rule to allow for conversion from rate-based emissions reductions 
achieved through 111(d) to mass-based emissions reductions.   
Any preexisting regulation of stationary sources under Section 111 thus can be 
integrated with a Section 115 program.  But compared with additional regulation of other 
individual stationary source categories under Section 111, a comprehensive program 
under Section 115 is more sensible.  Indeed, although EPA has finalized NSPS and 111(d) 
rulemakings for power plants, and has initiated rulemakings for certain oil and gas sector 
operations and for municipal landfills, there are many other source categories that remain 
to be regulated.  Individually, source categories like oil refineries, steel mills, chemical 
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 Id. at 843 (“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is 
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”).  
262
 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,668.  
263
 A rate-based emissions standard measures emissions in pounds of pollutant emissions per unit of generating output. 
A mass-based emissions standard measures emissions in tons of carbon emissions.  
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plants, pulp and paper mills, and cement plants are much smaller emitters than power 
plants, but collectively they are a significant source of emissions.264  One analysis recently 
estimated that to meet the U.S.’s international pledge of a 26-28 percent reduction by 2025, 
emissions from these sources must be reduced by 18 percent.265  EPA could undertake a 
separate rulemaking for each of potentially dozens of industrial source categories, but this 
would be time-consuming and expensive for the agency and burdensome for state 
regulators to implement.  It would also result in a series of industry-specific rules that 
would deny the industrial sources the flexibility and cost-savings that could occur under a 
market-based approach that would allow cross-sectoral trading. 
In comparison, addressing these emissions through one Section 115 proceeding 
offers multiple advantages.  For EPA and the states, Section 115 allows consolidation of 
multiple separate rulemakings into a single process.  The SIP process through which a 
Section 115 regime would take shape would also allow the states maximum flexibility, 
including the opportunity to incorporate the use of market mechanisms.266  It is likely that 
relatively low-cost emission reductions will remain in the power sector even after 
implementation of the Clean Power Plan.267   Recognizing this, states could reasonably 
conclude that a cross-sectoral emissions credit trading program among the different source 
categories is the most efficient and lowest-cost way to reduce GHG emissions.  This would 
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 EPA estimates that collectively, industrial sources of GHG emissions are responsible for 21% of U.S. emissions, 
compared to 31% for the electricity sector. EPA, U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORY REPORT: 1990-2013 (2015), 
http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/usinventoryreport.html. 
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 World Resources Institute, Delivering on the U.S. Climate Commitment: A 10-Point Plan Toward a Low-Carbon 
Future (World Res. Inst., Working Paper 2015), http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/WRI15_WorkingPaper_post-
2020_0.pdf. 
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 42 U.S.C. § 7410. See also Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60 (1975); Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
267
 The Clean Power Plan will reduce power plant emissions by 32% below 2005 levels by 2030.  EPA, OVERVIEW OF 
THE CLEAN POWER PLAN, http://www2.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/clean-power-plan-existing-power-plants (last visited 
Nov. 26, 2015).  According to the Energy Information Administration, however, emission reductions of over 60% 
below 2005 levels are possible from the power sector under a $25 ton carbon price that increases by 5 percent (real) per 
year. Compare ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014 tbl. D5 (2014), 
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2014).pdf (showing electric power emissions of 826 million metric tons in 
2030 under the $25 carbon price case), with ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, EMISSIONS OF GREENHOUSE 
GASES IN THE U.S. fig.15 (2011), http://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/ghg_report/ghg_carbon.cfm (showing 
electric power emissions of 2,417 million metric tons in 2005).  Similarly, the World Resources Institute estimates that 
power sector emission reductions of over 50% below 2005 levels by 2030 would be cost effective. World Resources 
Institute, Delivering on the U.S. Climate Commitment: A 10-Point Plan Toward a Low-Carbon Future (World Res. 
Inst., Working Paper 2015), http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/WRI15_WorkingPaper_post-2020_0.pdf. 
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provide industrial sources the option of buying allowances from the power sector to meet 
their emission reduction obligations, thereby reducing costs for the industrial sector while 
simultaneously providing additional economic opportunity for the power sector.  This 
kind of broad market-based flexibility appears to be a special feature of regulation under 
Section 115. 
In addition, under a Section 115 SIP states could claim credit for GHG emissions 
reductions that result from efforts in areas not covered under Section 111, such as non-
Section 111 industrial sources, commercial and residential sources, transportation fuels, or 
urban transportation planning. 268   These credits could, in turn, reduce the emissions 
reductions necessary from individual source categories.   
Finally, a Section 115 regime would provide an important legal backstop for EPA’s 
other regulatory efforts.  Although EPA’s GHG regulations—including the NSPS for 
power plants and the Clean Power Plan—should be found to be permissible 
interpretations of the Clean Air Act and should withstand legal challenge, there is a risk 
that in the course of anticipated litigation the courts will find otherwise.  In the event a 
court overturns all or a part of these rules, EPA would nonetheless have authority to 
comprehensively regulate GHG emissions in the United States under Section 115.  
Moreover, in the event of a loss in court, states and industry actors who have made or 
planned to make investments in anticipation of GHG emissions regulations would not lose 
the benefits of their foresight.  Rather, they would be able to receive full credit for their 
GHG emissions reductions under Section 115.     
4.5 Transportation Fuels Regulation 
One potential challenge for state policymakers and EPA (in the event it produces a 
model implementation plan or a FIP) will be how to address GHG emissions from 
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transportation fuels.  The challenge is worth thinking about: The combustion of fossil fuels 
for transportation is the second-largest contributor to total greenhouse gas emissions in the 
United States, accounting for about 27% of GHG emissions.269  Section 115 would enable 
states to develop implementation plans that could employ transportation fuels regulation, 
expanding the universe of covered sources.  The most attractive option might be to 
integrate transportation fuels into a cross-sectoral, interstate market-based trading 
program, thus achieving the cost-savings and efficiency of a universal cap.  In such a 
market-based trading system, suppliers would hold emissions allowances based on the 
carbon content of the fuels they sell, as a reliable proxy for actual downstream emissions 
that will result from combustion by end-users.  Alternatively, states might opt for a low 
carbon fuel standard (LCFS) under a Section 115 SIP.  A carbon tax and other approaches 
would also be available to states under Section 115. 
At the federal level, EPA regulates transportation greenhouse gas emissions both 
through fleet-wide emission standards for new motor vehicles (which are primarily 
satisfied by improvements in fuel economy)270 and through annual quotas for renewable 
fuel use (the “renewable fuel standard” or “RFS”).271  State transportation fuel regulations 
must co-exist with these existing federal regulations.  Pursuant to Section 211(c)(4)(a) of 
the Clean Air Act, states are authorized to regulate vehicle-fuel emissions so long as the 
EPA has neither implemented its own controls for the relevant pollutant under Section 
211(c)(1), nor issued a formal finding that no controls are necessary.  Because EPA has 
never set direct limits on greenhouse gas emissions from vehicle fuels, and EPA’s 
renewable fuel standard comes under a separate Clean Air Act provision (Section 211(o)), 
state plans under a Section 115 regime would be able to set limits on emissions from 
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 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, SOURCES OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS, 
http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/sources/transportation.html.  
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 The National Program for greenhouse gas emissions and fuel economy standards was developed jointly by the EPA 
and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and applies to light duty cars and trucks in model 
years 2012–2016 (first phase) and 2017–2025 (second phase).  See, e.g., 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty 
Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624, 62,624 
(Oct. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600).  
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transportation fuels.  If EPA later decides to set direct limits on greenhouse gas emissions 
from fuels, 272  conflicting state fuel standards may be preempted by EPA regulations, 
pursuant to Section 211(c)(4)(a).  However, states could request a waiver from this 
provision, rely on a pre-existing waiver, or potentially credit emission reductions that 
exceed the federal standards through offset programs.273 
4.5.1 Including GHGs from Transportation Fuels in Emissions Trading Programs 
In a market-based trading system, fuel suppliers would hold emissions allowances 
based on the carbon content of the fuels or gas they sell, as a reliable proxy for actual 
downstream emissions that will result from combustion by end-users.  States could freely 
allocate allowances to these suppliers or require the suppliers to purchase them in an 
auction, or directly from other covered sources.  State plans adopting this approach would 
encompass GHG emissions from both stationary and mobile sources, thus achieving the 
cost-saving efficiency of a broad-based cap.  
California’s cap-and-trade program is a good model for how such a program could 
operate.   California incorporated transportation fuels in its cap-and-trade program 
beginning in January 2015.274  Transportation fuel suppliers need to purchase allowances 
covering the full amount of their greenhouse gas emissions.275  Suppliers can then pass on 
the full cost of those allowances to consumers, through higher fuel prices.  To avoid 
“regressive effects” on lower-income consumers, who spend a great percentage of their 
income on fuel, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) has discussed a per capita 
consumer rebate program, which would distribute a lump sum portion of auction 
proceeds to residents.  The California Legislature would need to adopt such a program.  
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 See PETITION FROM INSTITUTE FOR POLICY INTEGRITY TO EPA, PETITION FOR RULEMAKING UNDER SECTIONS 211 
AND 231 OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT TO INSTITUTE A CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEM FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM 
VEHICLE FUELS (2009), http://policyintegrity.org/documents/7.29.09IPIPetitiontoEPA.pdf.  
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See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7545(C)(4)(B), 7543(B).   
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 California has already initiated a program to regulate these emissions and incorporate them into the state’s trading 
program. See 17 CAL. CODE REGS. § 95802(a)(161) (2015); see also CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, 
GREENHOUSE GAS REPORTING GUIDANCE FOR SUPPLIERS OF TRANSPORTATION FUELS AND NATURAL GAS FUEL § 2.1 
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 See 17 CAL. CODE REGS. § 95852 (2015). 
Legal Pathways to Reducing GHG Emissions under Section 115 of the Clean Air Act 
 
Sabin Center| Emmett Institute | Policy Integrity 71 
 
A state seeking to use this approach will have to determine the appropriate point at 
which to regulate.  Transportation fuels are channeled through a complex system, with an 
“upstream” moment when the fuel enters the economy, a “downstream” moment when 
the fuel is combusted and GHGs are released into the atmosphere, and “midstream” 
moments when the fuel is being transported between supply and demand.  An 
“upstream” regulatory approach would regulate fuels at the point at which the energy is 
produced, such as the well or refinery.  As a practical matter, this would be difficult to 
implement under a Section 115 regime, as most producers are located in a small number of 
states, yet end-user greenhouse gas emissions occur in all 50 states.  A truly “downstream” 
approach would regulate at the point of emission: the tailpipe.  The most effective means 
of achieving this type of regulation would be through a carbon tax on gasoline, which has 
proven politically difficult.   
California has addressed this issue by regulating fuels midstream.  In California, 
transportation fuels are regulated upon exit from the fuel distribution terminal, or “rack.” 
A terminal rack refers to the fuel pump mechanism that delivers fuel from the terminal 
storage tanks into trucks, trailers, or railcars for distribution.276  In California, the owner of 
the fuel when it is moved out of the fuel terminal and into the distribution system (such as 
truck, rail, or pipeline) must comply with all cap-and-trade requirements.277  The rack is a 
convenient point of regulation for California because it is also the point at which all fuel 
taxes are assessed.  For any fuels that enter California without passing through California’s 
terminal racks, California requires suppliers to report the volumes delivered and sold to 
fueling stations. Such fuel suppliers are termed “enterers,” and are required to report as 
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fuel suppliers if they import transportation fuels outside of the bulk terminal system in 
quantities exceeding the state’s reporting threshold.278 
A similar midstream approach could be appealing for other states.  Many other 
states also assess their gas taxes at terminal racks, making this an attractive method of 
regulation that could be scaled up in a potential Section 115 regime.279 Even a small state 
like Rhode Island has six fuel terminals and collects all tax on motor fuels at the 
terminals.280 States must be careful not to regulate fuel suppliers more than once, and to 
only regulate fuels with a final destination in their state; however, this is already 
accounted for in assessing gas taxes.  By using the same point of regulation for state gas 
taxes and greenhouse gas regulation, states may increase efficiency and reduce 
government and industry compliance burdens.   
EPA may also need to address transportation fuel emissions under a Section 115 
FIP.  The same legal rationale that authorizes EPA to issue a Section 115 FIP, discussed 
above, applies equally here.  EPA has authority to regulate transportation fuels directly.281  
The agency could include transportation fuels under the emissions trading program it 
establishes in the FIP.      
4.5.2 Alternative Transportation Fuels Emissions Reduction Strategies 
In considering a potential Section 115 program and corresponding state 
implementation plans, policymakers would have several additional options for addressing 
emissions from transportation fuels, including carbon taxes, low carbon fuel standards, 
and regional transportation planning. 
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 For example, the current excise tax on vehicle fuels in Washington, or the “gas tax,” is charged at the terminal rack.  
See WASHINGTON GOVERNOR’S OFFICE, INCLUDING TRANSPORTATION IN A WASHINGTON STATE CAP-AND-TRADE 
SYSTEM: WHY AND HOW? 2 (2014), 
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Carbon taxes would be a permissible element of a Section 115 SIP because Section 
110(a)(2)(A) expressly authorizes states to use “economic incentives such as fees” to reduce 
emissions.282  Carbon taxes are in use in several places, including Finland, Sweden, Great 
Britain, Quebec, and British Columbia.  The program in British Columbia, for example, 
taxes different fossil fuels at different rates depending upon the intensity of their carbon 
emissions.  Moreover, a carbon tax need not be limited to transportation fuels; a Section 
115 state implementation plan could adopt a carbon tax for multiple sources and source 
categories.  A properly calibrated carbon tax would provide an economic incentive for all 
regulated sources to reduce emissions.  The design of a carbon tax involves similar choices 
and trade-offs as those involved in designing a cap-and-trade program.  State carbon taxes 
could only be imposed on greenhouse gas emissions from specified sources and activities 
within the state’s legal jurisdiction.  
Another alternative to a cap‐and‐trade program that would cover the transportation 
sector is a fuel performance standard, or low-carbon fuel standard (LCFS).  An LCFS 
typically sets a target for life‐cycle greenhouse gas or emissions intensity from 
transportation fuels.  The most effective LCFS would cover all existing transportation 
fuels, and would include future energy sources (e.g., advanced biofuels that have not yet 
been developed), which could be phased in at a later date.  State LCFS programs under a 
Section 115 regime could be designed to link to California’s existing LCFS, and to 
harmonize with existing federal standards.  
In 2007, California established a state LCFS, a performance standard mandating a 
10% reduction in the full lifecycle carbon intensity of California’s fuel mix by 2020.283  In 
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2011, California’s LCFS was challenged in federal court by industry groups who claimed 
that it violates the Dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.284  The Ninth 
Circuit held that the LCFS did not facially discriminate against out-of-state ethanol or oil 
producers because it made geographic distinctions based on carbon impact and intensity 
of various fuels, rather than based purely on state-of-origin.285  The Ninth Circuit then 
remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the ethanol provisions 
discriminate in purpose or effect.286  In August 2015, the district court dismissed the claims 
regarding the LCFS’s crude oil provisions, but allowed plaintiffs to proceed with their 
claim that the ethanol provisions discriminate against interstate and foreign commerce.287  
That claim will ultimately be determined through the application of the balancing test laid 
it in Pike v. Bruce Church.288  
State programs to encourage public transportation, high-density infill development, 
and energy efficiency could also be part of state implementation plans.  For example, in 
California, regional transportation planning to reduce per capita vehicles miles travelled is 
part of the AB 32 Scoping Plan 289  and led to passage of SB 375, the Sustainable 
Communities and Climate Protection Act of 2008.290  SB 375 instructs the California Air 
Resources Board to set regional emissions reduction targets from passenger vehicles.  The 
Metropolitan Planning Organization for each region must then develop a “Sustainable 
                                                                                                                                                                                
fuels from its program, including those used for aircraft, racing vehicles, locomotives, and ocean vessels. 17 CAL. CODE 
REGS. § 95482 (2015). 
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 CAL. AIR RES. BD., AB 32 SCOPING PLAN (2008), 
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 Sustainable Communities and Climate Protection Act of 2008, SB 375 (Steinberg), Chapter 728, California Statutes 
of 2008 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the Cal. Gov’t Code and the Cal. Pub. Res. Code), 
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Communities Strategy” that integrates transportation, land-use, and housing policies to 
plan for achievement of the emissions target for their region.  In the same manner, other 
states could develop regional transportation targets to reduce vehicle emissions in their 
Section 115 implementation plans. 
In short, Clean Air Act Section 115 could likely be used to regulate emissions from 
transportation fuels, highlighting one of the main benefits of a Section 115 regulatory 
approach: the ability to reach multiple sectors and enable cross-sector trading, which 
provides efficiency gains.  State and federal policymakers should consider whether 
greenhouse gas reductions would be best achieved through a cap-and-trade program or 
other viable methods, such as carbon taxes or performance standards.  Moreover, many of 
the considerations that apply to regulating transportation fuels would also apply to 
regulating commercial and consumer natural gas. Reaching these sources through an 
emissions trading program created through a Section 115 SIP or carbon tax would be 
relatively straightforward.291  
4.6 Offsets 
The final implementation issue we address in this paper is whether Section 115 
permits the use of offsets, and whether EPA could impose quality- or quantity-based 
restrictions on the use of offsets in state implementation plans under Section 115.  Offsets 
enable a pollution source that is subject to regulatory emissions standards to earn credit 
for the emissions reductions or sequestrations achieved by an actor not covered under the 
same regulatory scheme.  As with all flexibility mechanisms, the primary objective of 
offsets is to achieve the same environmental goals at lower compliance costs—or to 
achieve additional environmental gains by supporting increased regulatory stringency 
without raising overall compliance costs—in this case by taking advantage of potentially 
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low-cost abatement opportunities in unregulated sectors.  A secondary advantage of 
offsets is the potential stimulation of activity and innovation in unregulated sectors, 
including, in the case of international offsets, knowledge transfers to and engagement with 
developing countries.   
When carefully regulated, offsets have been successfully incorporated into cap-and-
trade programs.  In California, emitting sources can use offsets to satisfy up to 8% of their 
compliance obligation. 292   These offsets have been estimated to reduce marginal 
compliance costs from over $100 per ton to under $20 per ton, while maintaining program 
integrity by meeting high quality standards. 293  On the other hand, the EU has been 
criticized for allowing poor quality offsets to undermine program integrity.294   
There are two basic types of offsets:  offsets that reduce emissions from otherwise 
unregulated sources and offsets that result from sequestration of greenhouse gases already 
in the atmosphere.  From the perspective of a state’s implementation plan, these two types 
of offsets could occur in three different locations:  inside the state, outside the state but 
inside the United States, or in other nations.  This creates a matrix of six possible categories 
of offsets:  (1) in-state emission-reduction offsets; (2) in-state sequestration offsets; (3) 
interstate emission-reduction offsets; (4) interstate sequestration offsets; (5) foreign 
emission-reduction offsets; and (6) foreign sequestration offsets. 
Under Section 115, EPA should have considerable discretion to allow or disallow 
offsets in these categories.  Moreover, since Section 115’s obligations are implemented 
through Section 110’s SIP process, Section 110’s explicit authorization of “economic 
incentives” suggests that cost-minimizing compliance options like offsets should be 
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broadly available under Section 115.  The only offset category the agency may not be able 
to prohibit is in-state emission-reduction offsets.  For any category of offsets that EPA 
permits, the agency should have broad authority to set quality standards that ensure that 
only real, verifiable offsets count toward compliance.   
EPA’s discretion is most limited in the case of intra-state offsets from uncovered 
sources that reduce emissions.  Section 115 requires states to revise their implementation 
plans to “prevent or eliminate the endangerment” to foreign nations from air pollution in 
the United States.295  The provision never mentions placing controls on any specific sources 
or sectors.  In fact, the law is clear that under Section 110, states may select their own mix 
of flexible compliance options when devising plans to meet Section 115’s obligations.296  So 
long as the SIP satisfies the state’s Section 115 obligation by achieving the emissions target 
set by EPA, the state should have authority to count emission reductions from any source 
within the state, including offsets from otherwise unregulated sources of emissions.297  
EPA is likely to have discretion to allow or disallow the other five types of offsets.  
In the case of  interstate emission-reduction offsets, EPA would have discretion to interpret 
both the language in Section 115(a) calling for notification of “the State in which such 
emissions originate” of the need to revise its implementation plan,298 as well as the general 
absence in both Section 115(b) and Section 110 of any limitation on state implementation 
plans restricting out-of-state efforts.  As a result, EPA should have discretion either to 
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 42 U.S.C. §§ 7415(a), (b) (2010).  
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 Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975) (“[S]o long as the ultimate effect of a State’s choice 
of emission limitations is compliance with the national standards for ambient air, the State is at liberty to adopt 
whatever mix of emission limitations it deems best suited to its particular situation.”); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. 
Gorsuch, 742 F.2d 1028, 1036 (7th Cir. 1984) (“EPA determines the ends—the standards of air quality—but Congress 
has given the states the initiative and a broad responsibility regarding the means to achieve those ends through state 
implementation plans.”); Texas v. EPA, 690 F.3d 670, 675 (5th Cir. 2012); WildEarth Guardians v. McCarthy, No. 13-
CV-1275-WJM-KMT, 2014 WL 943136, at *5 (D. Colo. Mar. 11, 2014) (“An important aspect of the CAA is each 
state’s ‘wide discretion’ in formulating its SIP.”) (citing United Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 250 (1976) and Train)).  
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 See, e.g., Train, 421 U.S. at 79 (“The Act gives the Agency no authority to question the wisdom of a State’s choices 
of emission limitations if they are part of a plan which satisfies the standards of § 110(a)(2).”); Virginia v. EPA, 108 
F.3d 1398 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (upholding Train); Michigan, 213 F.3d at 668 (“[T]he states remain free to implement other 
‘cost-effective’ and ‘reasonably cost-effective’ measures in place of the ones identified by EPA.”); Texas, 690 F.3d at 
675; Alabama Envtl. Council v. EPA, 711 F.3d 1277, 1280 (11th Cir. 2013) (“If the SIP revision meets the 
requirements in the Clean Air Act, the EPA must approve it.”). 
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require that all reductions occur inside the state, which would prevent use of interstate 
emission-reduction offsets, or to allow states to satisfy their obligations by obtaining 
reduction credits from outside the state, which would permit these offsets.  However, 
prohibition of interstate offsets could complicate the legal authority for interstate 
trading.299 
EPA is even more likely to have discretion to authorize or not authorize 
international emission-reduction allowances.  Section 115 applies to “any air pollutant or 
pollutants emitted in the United States” that endanger other countries. 300  EPA could 
reasonably interpret this language as requiring that all reductions required under Section 
115 be from “pollutants emitted in the United States.”  On the other hand, the reciprocity 
language in Section 115(c) expressly contemplates an internationally collaborative 
approach to global pollution problems.301  The legislative history also emphasizes the 
importance of “cooperative action with foreign countries.”302  Since the statutory language 
is silent, EPA could permissibly interpret the internationalism embodied in Section 115 as 
allowing foreign emission-reduction offsets.  
Offsets involving sequestration, such as those resulting from planting trees or 
capturing carbon in other plants or soil, present a slightly different question.  In the case of 
sequestration offsets, no pollution-emitting sources are reducing their emissions; instead, 
they are seeking to claim a credit for activities that pull GHGs out of the atmosphere.  
Section 115 references “pollution emitted in the United States,” but the statute is silent on 
whether EPA must therefore require states to reduce gross emissions or if a net reduction 
in total GHG pollution is sufficient.  EPA could read the statute narrowly to require states 
                                                     
299
 It is unclear whether EPA could allow interstate trading of GHG allowances while prohibiting use of interstate 
emission-reduction offsets.  The rationale for prohibiting interstate emission-reduction offsets—namely, that the 
emission reductions must be achieved within the state—would appear to apply equally to interstate trading.  As a 
practical matter, allowing interstate trading while prohibiting interstate offsets would not be an effective strategy, 
because sources in other states could game the system by using offsets in their states to generate tradable allowances, 
nullifying the effect of the prohibition on interstate offsets.  
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 42 U.S.C. § 7415(a) (2010).  
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 42 U.S.C. § 7415(a) (2010).  
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 S. REP. NO. 89-192, at 6 (1965).  
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to come into compliance exclusively through emission reductions or more broadly to 
permit states to claim credits for efforts to sequester GHGs from the atmosphere. 
After EPA decides what categories of offsets to permit or deny, the agency must 
also determine what quality standards the offsets must meet.  Under Section 110, EPA is 
charged with reviewing the adequacy of state implementation plans, which must be 
“enforceable,”303 “insur[e] compliance” with Section 115 requirements,304 and provide for 
adequate personnel to ensure compliance. 305   These provisions give EPA authority to 
require that offsets are: 1) quantifiable and measured against a realistic baseline; 2) “real” 
(i.e, not fraudulent or accounting artifacts), “additional” (i.e., would not have occurred 
otherwise without the financial incentive provided by the offset credit), and have not 
caused “leakage” (e.g., not allowing offsets from a deforestation program in one region to 
shift deforestation to another region); 3) monitored and permanent (e.g., preventing 
reforestation credits from being erased years later by fire); and 4) unambiguously owned 
and not double counted.306  In fact, existing EPA regulation of offsets under the Clean Air 
Act’s nonattainment new source review program sets some similar quality goals for state 
implementation plans.307  EPA can also ensure that states adopt a reliable and adequate 
mix of quality assurance techniques—such as third-party verification, regular audits, and a 
discount factor to account for uncertain quality—and can also require monitoring and 
reporting.308   
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California’s example shows the role that quality requirements can play.  The 
California Air Resources Board could have authorized about 26 million offset credits in 
2013 and 2014, since by state law covered sources may count offsets toward compliance for 
8% of annual allowance budgets.309  The Air Resources Board, however, approved only 
about 12.5 million as meeting the state’s standards.310  Even though California’s law allows 
international offsets, none have yet been qualified as meeting the state’s requirements.311  
Enforcement has also been used to ensure the quality of offsets in California’s program.  
The state recently concluded an investigation into 4.3 million offsets for quality violations 
and invalidated 89,000 credits as faulty or fraudulent.312   
Finally, EPA may have avenues to limit the quantity of offsets in a SIP.  One 
approach could be to develop a model offset program containing a quantity limit that 
states could elect to incorporate into their SIPs.  Another might be to allow states access to 
a quantity-limited pool of offsets pre-approved by EPA.  In the case of international 
offsets, an additional approach EPA could consider would be to allow offsets only from 
nations with which the United States has entered into an agreement that ensures the 
quality of the offsets and protects against double-counting.  A component of the 
agreement could be an understanding that the foreign nation would limit the quantity of 
offsets available for compliance with Section 115.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
the [monitoring, record-keeping, and recording] provisions as . . . too vague and not replicable . . . . We find that the 
EPA’s action amounts to an insistence on a particular control measure and is inconsistent with the principles of 
cooperative federalism that are an essential part of the [Clean Air Act.]”). 
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 CAL. AIR RES. BD., INTERNATIONAL SECTOR-BASED OFFSET CREDITS, 
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5. CONCLUSION 
Section 115 of the Clean Air Act is an untapped but potent source of federal 
authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions and to help achieve the United States’ 
long-term climate change goals.  These goals include achieving significant GHG emissions 
reductions in an economically and administratively efficient manner that provides for 
ample flexibility for states and regulated entities and opportunities for continuing 
innovation.  EPA and the states could implement a Section 115 regime with less difficulty 
than the current, sector-by-sector, source-by-source approach. It would allow EPA and the 
states to combine multiple sectors and source types in a single rulemaking that could 
establish a nationwide, cross-sectoral emissions trading program.  This program would 
arguably provide the most effective and efficient means of furthering climate action in the 
United States in the absence of new legislation.             
Regulation of GHG emissions under Section 115 would also be legally defensible.  
There is no question that greenhouse gas emissions are causing and contributing to 
anthropogenic climate change, nor that climate change endangers the public health, 
welfare, wellbeing, and in some instances very existence of foreign countries.  In addition, 
the conferral of mutual procedural rights and shared substantive commitments to GHG 
emissions reductions made by the U.S. and other countries through the UNFCCC, 
including the Paris Agreement, and multiple bilateral and multilateral arrangements 
establish reciprocal benefits that satisfy Section 115’s reciprocity requirement.  Indeed, the 
very purpose of Section 115 is to enable the U.S. to cooperate more effectively with foreign 
countries to address international air pollution problems.    
Finally, the issues that would confront implementation of a Section 115 regime are 
complex but manageable.  EPA is well-positioned to establish a national aggregate GHG 
emissions reduction target, to allocate emissions among the states, to integrate existing 
climate change regulations with a new Section 115 program, to incorporate transportation 
fuels and commercial and residential natural gas, and to determine whether and how to 
utilize emissions offsets in an emissions trading program.  The benefits of working 
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through these issues would be significant.  Ultimately, regulation of GHG emissions under 
Section 115 would provide EPA with the opportunity to develop a comprehensive, 
market-based, nationwide platform that would increase the scope of emissions covered, 
streamline administrative efforts, and maximize market efficiencies.  
The U.S. has pledged to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to a degree that likely 
requires action beyond current regulatory efforts.  And in order to avoid the worst impacts 
of climate change the nation, and the world, will have to go far beyond current pledges.  
Section 115 offers a statutory basis to pursue our current and future GHG emissions 
reduction ambition, and could provide the tools we need to address climate change in an 
effective and efficient manner.              
 
